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Toward a Robust Conception of
"Independent Judgment": Back to
the Future?
By HARRY G. HUTCHISON*
Progress then consists in progressive de-humanization-A busy,
pointless, and, in the end, suicidal submission to technique.[1]
When workers are organized, they are complying with the law of
technical progress which requires all forms of human life to be-
come organized.
The worker through his unions is intensifying his own thralldom to
techniques, augmenting their powers of organization, and com-
pleting his own integration into that very movement from
which, .... unionism had originally hoped to free him.2
GIVEN THE CHANGES in the composition of the American
workforce, given the increased levels of education, experience, and
technical ability possessed by contemporary management and rank
and file workers, it is inevitable that conflict will arise concerning the
statutorily required separation between those individuals who are eli-
gible to unionize within the meaning of the National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA") and those workers who are justifiably excluded from
union bargaining units. The United States Supreme Court's recent
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1. Robert K. Merton, ForewordJAcQUEs ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY viii. In
"Ellul's conception, then, life is not happy in a civilization dominated by technique. Even
the outward show of happiness is bought at the price of total acquiescence." Id.
2. JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 358 (John Wilkinson trans. 1964).
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decision in NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc.3 provides an
additional opportunity to continue a persistent conversation about
the need to separate supervisors from rank and file workers. Inescap-
ably, this Supreme Court decision supplies a framework to assess
whether adjudication by the courts grounded in either textualism or
legislative history or whether policy driven analysis engaged in by the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or the "Board") enhances
human progress.
It has been suggested that the Wagner Act of 19354 was enacted
in response to the "growing distrust of market solutions to social and
economic problems"5 and the perceived "inability of the courts to pro-
vide viable solutions to the problems presented by the labor move-
ment."6 Legal theorists emphasized that the emerging "process of
case-by-case adjudication was an inadequate instrument for the formu-
lation of a cohesive policy or rational substantive norms of conduct. ' 7
Thus, "[t]he industrial revolution, and the combinations of capital
and of labor that it called to life, presented problems that called for
broad legislative solutions."8 In response to this movement, Senator
Wagner of New York conceived "the National Labor Relations Act to
be more than a weapon against the disruption of industry by labor-
management disputes."9 Indeed the NLRA was envisioned as a mecha-
nism to "lessen the inequality of bargaining power between labor and
management"10 and as "'an affirmative vehicle' for economic and so-
cial progress.""' Hence, it was maintained:
Caught in the labyrinth of modern industrialism and dwarfed by
the size of corporate enterprise, [the employee] can attain free-
dom and dignity by cooperation with others of his group.' 2
3. No. 99-1815, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4119 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
4. 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
5. DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAw 13 (1999) [hereinafter RAy ET
AL.].
6. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS AcT 3 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d. ed. 992) [hereinafter THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAw].
7. Id. at 4.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 27; see RAY ET AL., supra note 5, at 13. But see Kenneth Casebeer, The Workers'
Unemployment Insurance Bill, in LABOR LAw IN AMERICA 231, 253 (1992).
10. Bryan M. Churgin, Comment, The Managerial Exclusion Under the National Labor
Relations Act: Are Worker Participation Programs Next? 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 557 (1999).
11. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 6, at 27-28.
12. 79 CONG. REC. 7565 (1935) (statement of Senator Wagner) (quoted in THE DEVEL-
OPING LABOR LAw, supra note 6, at 28).
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The question of whether the elusive goals of freedom and dignity
for workers have been achieved or are even achievable within the con-
fines of innovative and visionary New Deal labor legislation has
spawned a continuing and perhaps irresolvable debate. Despite the
NLRA's alleged innovative and visionary character, it seems far from
clear that the aspirational objectives of industrial democracy, 13 alleg-
edly embedded within the Act, have been completely achieved; on the
contrary, unions are experiencing hard times.14 One account as to
why unions in the private sector have continued to lose ground is that
they no longer "provide their membership with benefits that exceed
their costs."' 5 On the other hand, while the overall rate of unioniza-
tion has declined substantially during past decades "the rate of unioni-
zation among professional employees has substantially increased,' 6
animated in part by the desire to participate in both the development
of employer policy and personnel decisions about fellow profession-
als.' 7 Some observers view this development "as a primary hope for
the future of the American labor movement."' 8 Still, a number of
scholars are in such despair that they propose starting over, 19 as they
stress that the United States has entered "a time of great risks to [its]
fragile institutions of workplace democracy."20 Those scholars who are
13. See Ray ET A., supra note 5, at 13 (stating collective bargaining, it was thought,
would restore an element of fairness and industrial democracy to the workers and redis-
tribute income).
14. See, e.g., Paul C. Weiler, Hard Times for Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58 U.
CHi. L. REv. 1015, 1016-21 (1991); see also Barry T. Hirsch& EdwardJ. Schumacher, Private
Sector Union Density and the Wage Premium: Past, Present, and Future, (working paper) available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taPabstract-id=283203), at 1 (2001) ("At the end of the
century, the percentage of private wage and salary workers who were union members was
less than 10 percent, not greatly different from union density prior to the [passage of the]
NLRA.").
15. Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal
Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L. J. 1357, 1407 (1983).
16. David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Pro-
fessional Employees? 99 YALE L. J. 689, 690 (1990) [hereinafter Rabban, Can American Labor
Law Accommodate Coll. Barg.]. Often unions representing professional employees stress that
they seek legal protection for traditional professional values, which include developing
organizational policy, significant responsibility for personnel decisions about fellow profes-
sionals, and the commitment of organizational resources to professional goals. See id. at
691.
17. See id. at 691.
18. Id. at 690.
19. See Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unor-
ganized Workers, 69 CHi.-KENrr L. REv. 59, 59-96 (1993).
20. Karl Kare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform,
38 CATH. U. L. Rv. 1, 2 (1988) [hereinafter Kare, Workplace Democracy & Market
Reconstruction].
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enthralled by the wistful dream of radical class consciousness empha-
size the need for redoubled efforts at unionization, as they argue that
"we need to enlarge our conceptions of workplace democracy . . .
[and] be ready to experiment and take conceptual and practical risks
to seize the opportunities and potential of the times." 21 Progress on
this front will apparently have to await the success of these new efforts.
In contrast, Jacques Ellul's global assessment emphasizes that "[1] abor
and trade unions made their appearance as the great human protest
against the inhuman character of capitalism . . . . However, in all
countries labor unionism has completely lost its original character
and become a purely technical organization." 22 While it is true that
union density in the private sector continues to decline in the United
States23 and in many other countries, 24 and while it is likely that Amer-
ican labor unions have lost some of their original character and vital-
ity, it is also true that the nature and character of work and working
life both in the United States and the larger world have changed and
continue to metamorphose. Hence, the drafters of the NLRA "could
not have contemplated the composition of the nation's current labor
force."25 Still, it may not be obvious that Ellul is entirely correct about
the deficiencies of labor unions in light of the transformation of the
21. Id.
22. ELLUL, supra note 2, at 357. By "technical organization," Ellul means a process by
which appropriate tasks are assigned to individuals or groups so as to attain an efficient
and economic method and by a process of coordination and combination of all their activi-
ties the objectives "agreed" upon are achieved. This leads to standardization and to the
rationalization of economic and administrative life. Society and labor unions then attempt
to resolve in advance all the problems that might impede the functioning of an organiza-
tion. This dampens the need for ingenuity, inspiration or even intelligence to find a solu-
tion at the moment some difficulty arises. Standardization then relies on methods and
instructions, which create impersonality as opposed to individuality and human vitality. See
id. at 11-12. For at least partial agreement from a radical perspective, see CHRISTOPHER L.
TOMLINS, THE STATE AND UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 xiii (1985) (arguing that the American state, largely
through its legal institutions, has conditioned the legitimacy of labor activity and collective
bargaining on their effectiveness as "means to higher productivity and efficient capital ac-
cumulation" (cited in David M. Rabban, Has the NLRA Hurt Labor?, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 407,
408 (1987) (book review))).
23. See Charles Craver, Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The Inadequacy of Modest
Proposals to Reform Labor Law, 93 MIcH. L. REv. 1616, 1616 (1995) (predicting that the
private sector union density rate may fall to five percent by the end of the 1990s) (citation
omitted).
24. See, e.g., G. Celia & T. Treu, National Trade Union Movements, in COMPARATIVE LA-
BOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 305, 329-30
(R. Blanpain & C. Engels eds., 1998) (many indicators of union crisis are visible, including
the decline of union membership and density in most market economies).
25. Churgin, supra note 10, at 560.
[Vol. 36
workforce and workplace. While some labor unions have come to be
dominated by agendas that are not necessarily congruent with the
needs of all the workers they claim to represent, 26 while it is possible
that unions have "used their bargaining power to destroy black work-
ers' jobs or to advance the interests of their white membership at the
expense of black workers," 27 while labor unions can often be seen as
instruments of hierarchical power and even subordination that con-
centrate their energies less on the disadvantaged among us and more
on demands of distant union leadership, 28 and while it is possible that
a case can be made for scrapping New Deal labor legislation entirely,29
it is conceivable that some unions continue to represent the interests
of workers. Nonetheless, Ellul seems very close to the mark with his
contention that human progress, not to mention human individuality,
is becoming eviscerated by an increasingly technological society con-
sumed by increasingly technical adjustments and arguments.
Since the NLRA was enacted to reduce the role of courts, and
since there is some debate about the goals of the NLRA, the imple-
mentation of the aspirational objectives of the NLRA increasingly de-
pend on legal and administrative technicians located within the
NLRB. Nor has the NLRA completely eliminated the role of the
courts. On the contrary, the NLRA, through its enforcement mecha-
nism, relies on the courts to resolve increasingly technical arguments
that are often regurgitated in the form of additional legislation, litiga-
tion, or NLRB analysis. This approach seems to mirror Justice Frank-
26. See Molly S. McUsic & Michael Selmi, IowA L. REV. 1339, 1346-49; see also Harry G.
Hutchison, Reclaiming the Labor Movement Through Union Dues? 33 UNIV. OF MICH. J. OF L.
REFORM 447, 457, 494-95 (2000) [hereinafter Hutchison, Reclaiming the Labor Movement
Through Union Dues?] (explaining that while union members have largely opposed the use
of union dues for political and ideological purposes, union expenditures for political pur-
poses per union member continue to rise); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 309
(quoting MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLEcTIVE ACTION 29 (1965)) (there is a system-
atic tendency for "exploitation" of the larger group or the group as a whole by smaller
segments of the group).
27. Stephen Plass, Dualism and Overlooked Class Consciousness in American Labor Laws, 37
Hous. L. REv. 823, 829 (2000).
28. See, e.g., Harry Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception of Minimum
Wage Regimes: Exploding the Power of Myth, Fantasy and Hierarchy, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 93,
125-29 (1997) [hereinafter Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception of Mini-
mum Wage Regimes] (often American labor leaders, like those in South Africa, support mini-
mum wages and thus continued the subordination of black workers).
29. See Epstein, supra note 15, at 1357 (arguing that "New Deal legislation is largely a
mistake that if possible, should be scrapped in favor of the adoption of a sensible common
law regime relying heavily upon tort and contract law."). Such an approach would not
eliminate labor unions but might limit the bilateral monopoly power associated with
mandatory bargaining contained within the NLRA. See id. at 1404.
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furter's observation about the hyper-technical "process of litigating
elucidation. 30
The point of departure for these musings is the judgment by the
United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Kentucky River Community
Care, Inc.,3 1 decided in the 2000 term. The decision in Kentucky River
continues a persistent dialogue that preceded3 2 the Supreme Court's
decision in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB.33 In Packard, decided
shortly before the Taft-Hartley Act, and which provided additional im-
petus for the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Supreme Court
enforced an NLRB judgment that questioned whether foremen "are
entitled as a class to the rights of self-organization, collective bargain-
ing, and other concerted activities." 34 Kentucky River once again places
nurses and health care workers at the center of a continuing debate
over the coverage of professionals and the exclusion of supervisors.35
The Kentucky River Court, relying principally on the statutory text, af-
firmed the denial of the NLRB's request for an enforcement order
because it determined that the employer effectively met its burden 36
by proving at the certification stage that six registered nurses ("RNs")
who had been included in the proposed bargaining unit were supervi-
sors.37 While the Court's decision focused on the meaning of the
phrase "responsibly to direct,"38 the case primarily turns on the mean-
ing of the phrase "independent judgment."39 Independent judgment
30. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzalez, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1994).
31. No. 99-1815, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4119 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
32. See, e.g., Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943).
33. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
34. Id. at 486.
35. See, e.g., NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571 (1994); Ever-
green Healthcare, Inc. v. NLRB 104 F.3d 867 (6th Cir. 1997); Nymed, Inc. v. United Indus.
Workers Local 424, 320 N.L.R.B. 806 (1996); Beverly Cal. Corp. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 1548
(6th Cir. 1992).
36. There is an apparent statutory ambiguity concerning who has the burden of prov-
ing or disproving a challenged employee's supervisory status. "The Board therefore has
filled the statutory gap with the consistent rule that the burden is borne by the party claim-
ing that the employee is a supervisor." Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815, slip op. at 4
(U.S. May 29, 2001); see also Masterform Tool Co., 327 N.L.R.B. 1071, 1071-72 (1999).
37. Approximately 110 professionals and nonprofessionals were apparently included
in the bargaining unit. The NLRB had already excluded roughly twelve others (managers
and supervisors). Ky. River Cmty. Care, No. 99-1815, slip op. at 2 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
38. Brief for the Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. at 13-16, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care,
Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
39. The Board took the position in its brief that the case is limited solely to the inter-
pretation of "independent judgment" and disavows any claim that the term "responsibly to
direct" is implicated. See Brief for the NLRB at 21-22, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc.,
No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001); Brief for the Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. at 13-16, NLRB v.
Ky. River Cmty. Care, No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
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is an ambiguous term with respect: (1) to the degree of discretion
required, and (2) to the degree (or kind) of judgment necessary for
supervisory status.40 In essence, the case implicates issues previously
litigated in NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America4t in which
the Court rejected the NLRB's patient care analysis to find that RNs
were supervisors. Similarly, in NLRB v. Yeshiva University,42 the Court
found that faculty members were managerial employees. These cases
"indicate a split on the Court concerning the level of employee discre-
tion that can be accepted without fundamentally undermining work-
place hierarchy. ''43
This split had its genesis in Packard. Kentucky River lays the founda-
tion for a renewed debate about the proper scope of the NLRA as
amended by the Taft-Hartley Act. It also offers a venue for, once
again, reviewing Supreme Court jurisprudence in this contested
arena. This arena is made all the more poignant by virtue of the pro-
portionate reduction in blue collar/industrial workers and the rise in
professional and technical workers within the United States'
workforce .44
In the NLRA there are "two broad areas of employee exemptions:
(1) persons specifically exempted from the definition of employee
and the Act's coverage, and (2) persons who work for persons defined
by the Act as 'non-employers."' 45 The exclusion of supervisors from
coverage by the Act was approved, inter alia, to "further the interest [s]
of employers in the undivided loyalty of supervisors and the interest of
employees in organizing free of supervisory interference .... "46 This
40. See Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815, slip op. at 6 (U.S. May 29, 2001). ("Many
nominally supervisory functions may be performed without the 'exercis[e of] such a de-
gree of ... judgment or discretion . . . as would warrant a finding' of supervisory status
under the Act.") (citations ommitted).
41. 511 U.S. 571 (1994).
42. 444 U.S. 672 (1980); see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974)
(defining the test for managerial employees as "those [employees] who 'formulate and
effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their
employer.'"); Churgin, supra note 10, at 559-60.
43. George Feldman, Workplace Power and Collective Activity: The Supervisory and Manage-
rial Exclusions in Labor Law, 37 Aviz. L. REv. 525, 545 (1995) [hereinafter Feldman, Work-
place Power].
44. See David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from Covered Professionals
Under the NLRA, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1775, 1776 (1989) [hereinafter Rabban, Distinguishing
Excluded Managers].
45. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 6, at 1608. "Personnel excluded from the
Act are not prevented from voluntarily organizing and from being voluntarily recognized."
Id.
46. RAY ET AL., supra note 5, at 21.
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exclusion, accordingly, constitutes a form of employer protection
from distracted and divided management. In Health Care, Justice Gins-
burg stressed that the supervisory exclusion was adopted "to bind to
management those persons 'vested with... genuine management pre-
rogatives' . . . i.e., those with the authority and duty to act specifically
'in the interest of the employer' on matters as to which management
and labor interest may divide." 47
The Kentucky River decision implicates section 2(11) of the
NLRA48 under which some "employees are deemed to be 'supervisors'
and thereby excluded from the protections of the Act";49 and section
2(12), which defines professionals as employees for purposes of inclu-
sion within the NLRA. Consistent with section 2(11) workers are:
Supervisors if (1) they hold the authority to engage in any 1 of the
12 listed supervisory functions [such as to responsibly direct], (2)
their "exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or cleri-
cal nature, but requires the use of independent judgment," and
(3) their authority is held "in the interest of the employer. '50
Since many nurses are professionals, or at the very least technical
personnel, and since "most professionals supervise to some extent, ' 51
the Board can evidently claim, consistent with section 2(12) of the
Act, that "the judgment even of employees who are permitted by their
employer to exercise a sufficient degree of discretion is not 'indepen-
dentjudgment' if it is a particular kind ofjudgment, namely 'ordinary
professional or technical judgment in directing less-skilled employees
to deliver services.' "52 It is conceivable that the proper scope of the
supervisory exclusion is constrained by Board interpretations, which
affirm that professionals are covered employees. One argument in
favor of this assertion is that a broad interpretation of the language
which defines "supervisor" might serve to nullify or narrow the statuto-
rily mandated inclusion of professionals. 53 The Board, therefore, has
47. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 597 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-164 (1994).
49. NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815, slip op. at 1 (U.S. May 29, 2001);
see also National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (11) (1994).
50. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815, slip op. at 7 (U.S. May 29, 2001) (citing
Health Care, 511 U.S. at 573-74).
51. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 588 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
52. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815, slip op. at 7 (U.S. May 29, 2001) (citing
Brief for Petitioner at 11).
53. See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 585 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("If the term 'supervisor'
is construed broadly, to reach everyone with any authority to use 'independent judgment'
to assign and 'responsibly. . . direct' the work of other employees, then most professionals
would be supervisors, for most have some authority to assign and direct others' work."); see
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drawn a distinction between those nurses who directed aides on the
basis of the RNs' highly developed professional skills, which it con-
cluded did not constitute an exercise of supervisory authority in the
interest of the employer, and those nurses who, in addition to their
professional duties, possessed the authority to make effective recom-
mendations as to job status and pay.54 The Board maintains its author-
ity in this arena despite judicial rebuke and contrary adjudication by
the courts.5 5 This has led one court to state:
The Board's biased mishandling of cases involving supervisors in-
creasingly has called into question our obeisance to the Board's
decisions in this area.
Recognizing that the NLRB earns and forfeits deferential judicial
review by its performance, [recent supervisor] cases hold in sub-
stance that the Board's manipulation of the definition of supervi-
sor has reduced the deference that otherwise would be accorded its
holdings.
5 6
Kentucky River "presents two questions: [first,] which party in an
unfair-labor-practice proceeding bears the burden of proving or dis-
proving an employee's supervisory status; and [second,] whetherjudg-
ment is not 'independent judgment' to the extent that it is informed
by professional or technical training or experience."5 7 Only the latter
question is of interest here. In Kentucky River, the Supreme Court re-
solved the latter tension in favor of the employer and against the
Board. It should be obvious that one ground for dissent is quite ele-
mentary: the Board's approach to resolving the tension between ex-
cluded supervisors and included professionals (impelled by alleged
statutory ambiguity) was both "rational and consistent with the Act ' 5 8
also Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815, Stevens, J., dissenting at 4 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
On the other hand, an expansive reading of the term "professionals" gives rise to the possi-
bility that the Board's interpretation will eliminate professionals as supervisors. See Brief for
Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. at 17-21, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S.
May 29, 2001).
54. Edwin A. Keller, Comment, Death by Textualism: The NLRB's "Incidental to Patient
Care" Supervisor Status Test for Charge Nurses, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 575, 587 (1996).
55. See G. Roger King, Where Have All the Supervisors Gone?-The Board's Misdiagnosis of
Health Care & Retirement Corp. 13 LAB. LAw. 343, 356 (1997).
56. Spentonbush/Red Star Co. v. NLRB, 106 F.3d 484, 492 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal
citations omitted).
57. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815, slip op. at 1 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
58. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 599 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. Curtin
Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 796 (1990)); see, e.g., RAY ET AL., supra note 5, at
22-23.
If any person who may use independent judgment to assign tasks to others or
direct their work is a supervisor, then few professionals employed by organiza-
tions subject to the Act will receive its protections. The Board's endeavor to rec-
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and is, accordingly, entitled to judicial deference. The majority of the
Court, on the contrary, grounded its ruling in its own understanding
of the text, concluded that the Board's "interpretation [would] insert
a startling categorical exclusion into [a] statutory test that does not
suggest its existence." 59 Moreover, the Court was alarmed that the
Board's eradication of professional judgment from the statutory de-
lineation of supervisors "would virtually eliminate 'supervisors' from
the Act."60 The Supreme Court, as a result, refused to enforce the
Board's order and thus the six RNs were excluded from NLRA cover-
age. The dissent, by contrast, concentrated on the text as informed by
the following: 1) its understanding of the statutory purpose and legis-
lative history; 2) its earlier expressed fear that "if any person who may
use independent judgment to assign tasks to others or direct their
work is a supervisor, then few professionals employed by organizations
subject to the Act will receive its protections";61 and 3) the Board's
"familiar" interpretation "which has been routinely applied"62 to find
the NLRB's interpretation of the term "independent judgment" to be
"rational and consistent with the Act. '63 Hence, the dissent believes
that the Board is entitled to deference.
This dispute between the majority and the dissent in Kentucky
River revolves around the proper understanding of the meaning of
terms such as "supervisor," "professional," "independent judgment,"
and "rational and consistent" under the Act. Although any resolution
of this debate may ultimately prove to be unworkable, this Article pro-
poses a possible line of attack. Premised on a reconsideration of the
past in light of current and future changes in the structure and com-
position of the workforce, this Article outlines workplace alterations
oncile the inclusion of professionals with the exclusion of supervisors, in my view,
is not just "rational and consistent with the Act," . .. it is required by the Act.
Id. at 23; see also HilaryJewett, Note, Professionals in the Health Care Industry: A Reconsideration
of NLRA Coverage of Housestaff 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1125, 1128-29 (1997); Kristin Hay
O'Neal, Comment and Note, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corporation of America:
Possible Implications for Supervisory Status Analysis of Professionals Under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 47 BAYLOR L. Rv. 841, 845-46 (1995) (distinguishing supervisors from
professionals).
59. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815, slip op. at 7 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
60. Id. at 8.
61. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 598 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Significantly, the Court
rejected the Board's claims that its approach was necessary to preserve the NLRA's explicit
protection of professional employees because the Board had no authority to manipulate
the language of the Act in the manner proposed by the Board. See id. at 581.
62. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815, Stevens, J., dissenting at 4 (U.S. May 29,
2001).
63. Id. (citations ommitted).
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since the 1940s in order to effect a principled reconsideration of Pack-
ard, as well as a critical examination of subsequent Supreme Court
cases as an instrument for examining Kentucky River. While this Article
reviews judicial opinions, extracts from the legislative history and
scholarly commentary, this Article scrutinizes the tension described
above largely in light of the Packard decision and dissent. This ap-
proach develops from an inspection of the contentious and relatively
recent debate between the Supreme Court majority opinion and dis-
sent in Health Care, as well other cases.64 The clash in Health Care was
grounded in both a controversy over textualism, 65 as well as the prece-
dential value of Packard66 as a vehicle for understanding both the "in-
terest of the employer" and the concept of divided loyalty within the
meaning of the original NLRA. The Health Care discussion ultimately
determined whether the individuals at issue excluded supervisors or
included professionals.
The NLRB's Kentucky River holding might be entitled to defer-
ence on technical grounds if the contested term was an entirely am-
biguous one and if the Board construed the statute within its statutory
purpose. However, this Article argues that a constrained conception
of the NLRA's animating purpose, derived from Justice Douglas's
Packard dissent, as engaged by a proper appreciation of the contempo-
rary workplace, supports the approach taken by a majority of the
Court in Kentucky River. This Article maintains that lawyers should take
seriously Justice Douglas's perceptive contention that broadening the
NLRA's protective umbrella to include supervisors, although poten-
tially warranted on policy grounds, "lends the sanctions of federal law
to unionization at all levels of the industrial hierarchy."67 Such broad-
ening radically contradicts the fundamental purpose of the original
statute aimed at separating working people as a group from manage-
64. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 267-311 (1974).
65. See generally Keller, supra note 54, at 576-623 (reviewing the textualist dispute as
derived from Health Care). Textualism evidently seeks objectivity in interpreting statutes by
not focusing on the legislative intent but rather on what an ordinary reader would have
understood the words to mean. It is a largely futile task to attempt to read into the author's
mind, which is compounded when there are several authors of a given text. Textualists do
concede that words are not self-defining, natural or original, but acquire meaning from
their background principles, perspectives and relevant culture. See iL at 609-12.
66. See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 596-98 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Notably in NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace, the Supreme Court majority "when reviewing the same relevant history of the
NLRA, chose to look to the Packard dissent." O'Neal, supra note 58, at 852-53.
67. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 494 (1947) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
Winter 2002]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
ment.68 Given the degree of discretion and the kind of judgment re-
quired of an ever growing cadre of contemporary workers69 within an
increasingly decentralized economy, efforts aimed at broadening the
application of the NLRA via a strained conception of "independent
judgment," which concurrently ignores the full text and the context of
the statute, remain problematic. This is especially true given that the
Taft-Hartley amendments placed additional limits on the statute's ani-
mating purpose. This analysis leads unmistakably toward a robustly in-
clusive conception of "independent judgment" that is consistent with,
and revives, a narrow interpretation of the NLRA.
Part I supplies argument, analysis, and background for reconsid-
ering Packard as a means of grappling with "independent judgment."
Part II surveys the environment for the persistent debate over the su-
pervisor exclusion and the parameters of both statutory and judicial
explications and limitations of the supervisory.exclusion. This Article
also inspects the NLRB's attempt to bring clarity to this contested
arena. Part III examines the Kentucky River decision itself. Part 1V ap-
plies Packard as implicated by contemporary changes in the workplace
to the Kentucky River case. This Article concludes by contending that
given the contemporary transformation of the workplace through de-
centralization, professionalism, and post-industrialization, hands-on
workers including registered nurses who inescapably make discretion-
ary independent judgments grounded in their professional experi-
ence and training should be excluded from the protective umbrella of
the NLRA because to do otherwise would expose their employers to
the threat of divided loyalty.
I. The Way Forward? A Reconsideration of Packard
The importance of Packard was revitalized by the Supreme
Court's Health Care discussion. The Health Care majority concluded
that the Packard majority accurately defined a vital element of the su-
pervisory exclusion when it examined the phrase "in the interest of
the employer"70 under the terms of the original Act. The Health Care
Court determined that there is no indication that Congress intended
68. See id. at 495-96.
69. See Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in New
Deal Hours Legislation, 96 MICH. L. Rv. 2212, 2212-21 (1998).
70. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 578 (citations ommitted). To be sure, when the Packard
opinion defined "in the interest of the employer" it was examining that phrase as con-
tained within the definition of employer. See Packard, 330 U.S. at 488. This phrase has been
deleted from the definition of employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988); see also O'Neal,
supra note 58, at 841.
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any different meaning when it included the phrase in the statutory
definition of supervisor later in 1947.71 Justice Ginsburg, writing for
the dissent, plainly and perceptively disagreed. She argued that the
dissenting views of Justice Douglas on the meaning of "in the interest
of the employer" were more applicable because Congress enacted a
definition excluding supervisors in response to Packard.72 According
to Justice Ginsburg, this implied that Congress embraced Justice
Douglas's perspective that "acting in the interest of the employer"
only fits employees who act for management either in the formula-
tions or execution of its labor policies. 73
The debate in Packard is implicated by contentions surrounding
(1) the largely outmoded notion of class conflict grounded in the ten-
sion between capital versus labor in light of workplace alterations; (2)
possible divergences in interests between mid-ranked employees and
those at the lower ranks in light of the original NLRA's expressed and
implied objective of allowing rank and file workers to organize free of
supervisory interference; (3) the gradual movement of workers up the
ranks of the hierarchy as engaged by employer concern for divided
loyalties of individuals who might be plausibly classifiable as supervi-
sory, managerial, or professional personnel-who putatively work in
the interest of the employer and yet seek the protection of concerted
action; and (4) the current textualism versus legislative history de-
bate74 as illuminated by a similar debate with a dissimilar conclusion
in Packard. Before reconsidering Packard in light of these questions, it
is appropriate to review the decision itself.
A. The Packard Decision
Before 1947, the Board generally excluded supervisors from bar-
gaining units that included employees subject to their supervision-
unless the case involved an established history within the industry of
including supervisors in such units. 75 In Packard, the NLRB estab-
71. See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 578.
72. Id. at 596.
73. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 596 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
74. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 54, at 576-77 (contending, among other things, that
the "extreme form" of textualism, which largely disregards legislative history as the pre-
ferred method of statutory interpretation could potentially threaten the separation of pow-
ers doctrine).
75. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 6, at 1608-09; see also Packard Motor
Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945).
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lished a bargaining unit composed entirely of supervisors. 76 The Su-
preme Court accepted the Board's conclusion that highly paid
foremen and other supervisory employees are entitled as a class to
organize as a unit of the Foremen's Association of America and en-
gage in other concerted activities. 77 The Foremen's Association was an
unaffiliated organization that exclusively represented supervisory em-
ployees.7 8 The Board held that "all general foremen, foremen, assis-
tant foremen, and special assignment men employed by the Company
at plants in Detroit, Michigan constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of section 9(b)
of the Act."79 The employer disagreed and refused to bargain with the
union. The Board countered with an unfair labor practice charge and
a cease and desist order. 80 The appellate court enforced the NLRB
order.81 In reviewing the appellate decision, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that "[the appellate court's] only function is to determine
whether the order of the Board is authorized by the statute."8 2
Before probing the Court's holding and its dissent, it is important
to examine the Court's summary of the role of foremen:
The function of these foremen in general is typical of the duties of
foremen in mass-production industry generally. Foremen carry the
responsibility of maintaining quantity and quality of production,
subject, of course, to the overall control and supervision of man-
agement. Hiring is done by the labor relations department, as is
the discharging and laying off of employees. But the foremen are
provided with forms and with detailed list of penalties to be ap-
plied in cases of violations of discipline, and initiate recommenda-
tions for promotion, demotion and discipline. All such
recommended actions are subject to the reviewing procedure con-
cerning grievances provided in collectively-bargained agreement
between the Company and the rank-and-file union.8 3
Foremen are charged with the execution of management prerog-
atives in the direction of laborers and working men pursuant to dis-
cretionary authority vested in them by their employer. But, the
question becomes: are they employees within the meaning of the Act?
Section 2(3) "provides [t]he term 'employee' shall include any em-
76. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 6, at 1608-09; see also Packard Motor
Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945).
77. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 487-90 (1947).
78. See id. at 487.
79. Id. at 487-88 (citations ommitted).
80. See id. at 488.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. Packard, 330 U.S. at 487.
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ployee .... ,,84 The Supreme Court majority avoided the policy impli-
cations on which the dissent dwells and maintained that "these
foremen are employees both in the most technical sense at common
law as well as in common acceptance of the term. '85 The Court rebuf-
fed the employer's contention that the statutory "term 'employer' 'in-
cludes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or
indirectly. . .' . The context of the Act... leaves no room for a con-
struction of this section to deny the organizational privilege to em-
ployees because they act in the interest of the employer."86 The Court
declared, "[e]very employee, from the very fact of employment in the
master's business, is required to act in his interest."87 Relying exten-
sively and questionably on the doctrinal confines of respondeat superior,
the Court implied that Congress was plainly "creating a new class of
wrongful acts to be known as unfair labor practices, and it could not
be certain that the courts would apply the tort rule of respondeat supe-
rior to those derelictions."8 8 Perforce those who act in the interest of
the employer, nonetheless, retain their own interest in better working
conditions and higher wages.8 9 Foremen are not "forbidden the pro-
tection of the Act when they take collective action to protect their
collective employment interests."90 The company conceded that fore-
men have the right to organize; but it denied that the NLRA compels
it to recognize the union.9 1 From the Packard Court's perspective, the
employer's opposition to placing foremen within the protection of the
Act is putatively rooted in a fundamental "misconception that because
the employer has the right to wholehearted loyalty in the perform-
ance of the contract of employment, the employee does not have the
right to protect his independent conditions of work. ' 92 The Court dis-
missed the employer's concern for potential divided loyalty and in-
stead argued that its power of review is circumscribed by statute and
thus it only retains the power "to determine whether there is substan-
tial evidence to support the Board, or its order oversteps the law."93
Finding such evidence, the Court determined that "the order insofar
84. Id. at 488 (citations ommitted) (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 489.
89. See Packard, 330 U.S. at 489.
90. Id. at 490.
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 491.
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as it depends on facts is beyond our power of review. ' 94 Foremen, ac-
cordingly, constitute an appropriate bargaining unit within the mean-
ing of the NLRA.
This holding was not without controversy. Justice Douglas issued
a blistering dissent that "poignantly illustrated the fallacies inherent in
the majority's opinion. ' 95 Douglas argued that the majority decision:
(1) obliterated the line between management and labor;96 (2) failed
to reach a principled conclusion as to the meaning of "employee" and
that its holding on that term is contrary to the Act which "put in the
employer category all those who acted for management[,] not only in
formulating but also in executing its labor policies;"97 (3) declined to
recognize that the evil at which the Act was aimed was the failure or
refusal of industry to recognize the right of working men, as a distinct
socioeconomic class, to bargain collectively;98 (4) refused to consider
the Act's legislative history, which is devoid of any Congressional con-
cern for the problems of supervisory personnel; 99 (5) failed to com-
prehend "that when Congress desired to include managerial officials
or supervisory personnel in the category of employees, it did so ex-
pressly"; 100 and (6) rejected Congress's objective which was aimed at
"legislating against the activities of foremen, not on their behalf."101
Since firms and employers are often bureaucratic organizations,
it is important to note that one leading English observer, Hugh Col-
lins, implies that bureaucracies impose subordination through hierar-
chical social structure and disparities in economic power.10 2 If true,
this dual source of subordination has the capacity to lead to worker
94. Id. The NLRB has held that supervisory employees may organize in a number of
early decisions. See, e.g., Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942) (supervisors may
organize in an independent union); Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 874 (1942) (supervi-
sors may organize in an affiliate union). On the other hand, the Board held in a number of
decisions that there was no unit appropriate to the organization of supervisory employees.
See, e.g., Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943); Boeing Aircraft Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 67
(1943).
95. Keller, supra note 54, at 580.
96. See Packard, 330 U.S. at 494 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 496.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 498.
100. Id. at 499.
101. Id
102. See Hugh Collins, Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, and the Contract of Employment,
15 INDUS. L.J. 1, 1-3 (1986) (the benefits of freedom of contract in the avowed equality of
bargaining power between workers and employers based on a concern for individual au-
tonomy); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947, 948-55
(1984).
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abuse and to arbitrary employer action.1 °3 Assuming arguendo the Col-
lins thesis, Justice Douglas's dissent bears additional analysis. First, if
the Packard decision obliterates the line between management and la-
bor, and if it lends sanction to the unionization at all levels of the
industrial hierarchy, then the term "employee" must surely mean that
"vice-presidents, managers, assistant managers, superintendents, assis-
tant superintendents-indeed, all who are on the payroll of the com-
pany, including the president"'10 4 must be subject to the protection of
the Act. Hence, the majority opinion could be seen as a broad inter-
pretation of the statute that is radicalized by the presumed conflict
between capital and labor as opposed to a less-radicalized view that is
focused on the possible conflict between management and labor. The
majority's approach ignores the employer's hierarchical social struc-
ture and evident differences in power and wealth between those lo-
cated at the higher end of the hierarchy and those at the bottom.
Congress, on the contrary, left no evidence of such a "basic change in
industrial philosophy." 10 5 Second, if Congress primarily aspired to im-
prove the lot of those at the lowest economic rung-the workingmen,
the laborers, and others whose disputes with employers led to eco-
nomic strife, 10 6 it remains doubtful that unionizing the middle and
upper rungs107 will result in a redistribution of income which favors
those at the bottom level. Douglas stated that while "employee" can be
defined to include "any employee," the very context of the Act sug-
gests that it is not an all embracing term.'0 8 Douglas also observes that
while "employer" includes "any person acting in the interest of an em-
ployer," the term must a fortiori include the employer and some em-
ployees-separation must occur where an individual (employee or
not) acts on behalf of "management not only in formulating but also
in executing its labor policies." 10 9 The phrase "'any person . . .
act[ing] in the interest of [an] employer' was meant to distinguish
between certain workers" 110 and not, as the majority opinion suggests,
"to create a new system of vicarious liability for [all] those involved in
103. See Packard, 330 U.S. at 497 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
104. Id at 494.
105. Id. at 495.
106. See, e.g., id. at 487-96 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also H. REP. No. 969 (1935); H.
REP. No. 972 (1935); H. REP. No. 1147 (1935); S. REp. No. 573, at 6-7 (1935).
107. See Packard, 330 U.S. at 497 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas points out
the "problems of those in the supervisory categories of management did not seem to have
been in the consciousness of Congress." Id. at 497.
108. See id. at 495 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 495-96.
110. Keller, supra note 54, at 580 (citing Justice Douglas's dissent in Packard).
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industry."'111 Lastly, Justice Douglas alleged that foremen and supervi-
sors were seen as instruments of oppression that largely blocked labor-
ers' attempts to organize." 2 In his dissent, he stated, "I have used the
terms foremen and supervisory employees synonymously. But it is not
the label which is important; it is whether the employees in question
represent or act for management on labor policy matters."113
In summary, while both the majority and the dissent in Packard
concede that many, if not most, employees are "acting in the interest
of an employer,"114 there is disagreement as to the importance of the
language of section 2(2). The majority's concern with respondeat supe-
rior is more than counterbalanced by the dissent's argument that the
Act was not declaring a policy of general vicarious responsibility of
industry. Instead, the statutory language focused on acting in the in-
terest of the employer dealt primarily with labor relations responsibil-
ity, including accountability of manager and supervisors to direct
others. Neither opinion speaks directly to the concept of "indepen-
dent judgment" which evidently separates "labor" from "manage-
ment," but Justice Douglas implies that an analysis of several factors is
valuable in both determining who is a supervisor, and for excluding
such employees from union coverage. He suggests looking at the in-
dustry's operations and/or the disputed employee's place in the com-
pany hierarchy, 1 5 examining who has the capacity to implement
management's labor policy, 1 6 and being wary of concluding that the
term "employee" is an all embracing term which obliterates the line
between management and labor.' 17
Fundamentally, the view expressed by Justice Douglas reflects a
limited conception of the purpose of the NLRA. The NLRA was an
unadventurous statute designed to channel labor dissatisfaction and
protests in an appropriate way. This conclusion was largely confirmed
by congressional reaction to this decision as well as other events, and
by Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Health Care. Congress placed greater
limits on labor unions and granted more rights to individual workers
111. Id. at 580 (citing justice Douglas's dissent in Packard).
112. See Packard, 330 U.S. at 499 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 500.
114. Id. at 489 (majority opinion); id. at 495-96 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
115. See Id. at 496 (Douglas,J., dissenting) (stating that "Trade union history shows that
foremen were the arms and legs of management in executing labor policies .... Manage-
ment indeed commonly acted through them .... ").
116. See id. at 496 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 494.
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and employers when it passed the Taft-Hartley Act 118 shortly after the
issuance of the Packard decision. On the other hand, if Congress en-
acted the Taft-Hartley Act to overturn the reasoning in Packard, not
just the decision, then the opinion and dissent require additional
analysis.
B. Analysis
Packard sets the stage for the development of the supervisory ex-
clusion from the NLRA, and thus subsequent decisions and subse-
quent workplace changes must be illuminated by an examination of
Packard's dialogue.
1. Radical Class Consciousness? The Assumed Conflict Between
Capital and Labor as Implicated by Both Statutory
Purpose and Workplace Changes
Packard supplies the locus of an intense dispute between Justice
Jackson for the majority and Justice Douglas for the dissent, encapsu-
lating two starkly different perspectives of appropriate limits of labor
law. These different perspectives affect (1) the concern for the possi-
bility that supervisory/management interest might trump the interest
of workers; (2) anxiety over the possibility that those who in engage in
discretionary decision making might be subject to divided loyalties as
articulated in subsection b(3); and (3) the last subsection's debate
over whether legislative history and statutory purpose should trump
the text. The contrasting outlooks of Justice Douglas and Justice Jack-
son in the Packard case have reappeared in more recent commen-
tary.119 The two viewpoints are grounded in two basic competing
notions about the purpose of labor protection: The rationalization of
the relationship between capital and labor perspective,1 20 which ap-
118. 61 Stat. 137 (1947).
119. See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, How the Wagner Act Came to Be: A Prospectus, 96
MICH. L. REv. 2201, 2203-07 (1998) (a number of the key players viewed the NLRA as a
conservative measure designed to channel protest and defuse rebellion); Klare, Workplace
Democracy & Market Reconstruction, supra note 20, at 2-16 (stating the apparently progressive
values and assumptions which support Market reconstruction and that have been embod-
ied in labor law since the New Deal have been and are under threat, which prevents the
necessary broadening of labor's collective power).
120. Magruder, an early proponent of the capital versus labor perspective provides this
elegant summary:
We seem to be moving slowly toward a more rational relationship between capital
and labor. For the better part of the past half century, the law tended, on the
whole, to retard this consummation. In the latter years its influence, decisively,
has been in the right direction. Such progress as we have made has been at need-
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parently identifies labor rights as a radical mass movement to trans-
form the structure, operation, and management of the workplace; 21
or the intra-workforce perspective, which views protection of organiza-
tional rights largely as a rather "conservative" measure aimed at reduc-
ing economic inequality while providing protection for the working/
lower economic class against the demands of employer controlled
management prerogatives. 122 The radical class oriented capital versus
labor perspective seeks to extend legal protection to the unionization
of supervisory or managerial employee and hence to expand the so-
cial role of unions by enlarging the definition of the class for whom it
is permissible for them to speak.123 While those captivated by this out-
look appear traumatized by the "decline of union membership and
density, and reduced capacity to mobilize industrial conflict .. the
declining appeal to the public of union ideals"'124 and, although this
outlook is highly focused on largely outmoded notions of class-wide
consciousness and class-based solidarity, 125 the capital versus labor
less cost of blood and tears, and economic wastage. If employers would now ac-
cept with right goodwill the principles of the National Labor Relations Act, as the
carriers generally have accepted its sister Act, it would mean: Away with yellow
dogs, company unions, blacklists, deputy sheriffs in the pay of employers, barri-
cades, tear gas, machine guns, vigilante outrages, espionage, and all that misera-
ble brood of union-smashing detective agencies. Can anyone doubt the cordial
response labor would make to such a gesture? The old ways will not work, could
not work, really. It is time for an act of faith.
Calvert Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon the Development of Collective Bargain-
ing, 50 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1117 (1937).
121. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 265-66 (1978) [hereinafter
Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act].
122. See, e.g., St. Antoine, supra note 119, at 2202-07 (noting it is possible to claim that
the Act was aimed primarily at assisting labor organizations and the working class
generally).
123. See Feldman, Workplace Power, supra note 43, at 526.
124. Cella & Treu, supra note 24, at 330. For evidence of trauma, see generally Craver,
supra note 23, at 1616-44; Gottesman, supra note 19, at 59-96; Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-
Hartley: A Slave-Labor Law?, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 763, 763-88 (1998).
125. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, "Labor's Divided Ranks" Privilege and the United
Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1542, 1542-43, (1999) (the labor movement assumes a
class-based solidarity that does not exist). Crain & Matheny acknowledge that American
unionists have embraced the united front ideology because they fear that acknowledging
divisions within the "working class" [broadly speaking] grounded in race and gender
would assist employers in their efforts to undermine working class solidarity by pitting one
group against another. This claim assumes but does not prove the existence of working
class solidarity. Working class solidarity may also be eviscerated by virtue of the fact that an
increasing number of employees (working class or .not) fail to see the employer as the
enemy. In fact, some workers want employee organizations to be staffed and funded by the
employer. See Sameul Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor Law Reform, 12
LAB. LAw. 118 n.2 (1996) [hereinafter Estreicher, The Dunlop Report].
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perspective, which obscures significant conflicts of interest within the
working class, may not be reflected in American statutory labor law. 126
The far reaching capital versus labor perspective, rooted in the
world of mass production, may be attached to the assumption that
workers who are engaged in similar "work at a common worksite share
common class and economic interest."127 This perspective implies that
all workers, as well as the society at large, will benefit from adversarial
collective bargaining aimed at reducing this putative disparity in re-
turn to capital and labor and by the extension of labor's independent
and collective power in managing the employer. This viewpoint is
made all the more ironic when one considers that most economic or
monopoly rents 128 in the United States already accrue to labor as op-
posed to capital. 129 It is doubtful that the adversarial capital versus
labor approach is attractive to all workers in a post-industrial society.
Workers' current views often seem contrary to union solidarity and may reflect persis-
tent changes in the workplace and in education among workers. As I have argued else-
where, the attractiveness of unions may reflect differences in the cultural and civilizational
context in which unions and unionism germinates. See Harry G. Hutchison, The Semiotics of
Labor Law, Trade Unions and Work in East Asia: "International Labor Standards" in the Mirror of
Culture? 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1451; 1467 (2000) [hereinafter Hutchison, The Semiotics of
Labor Law]. Thus changes in the cultural milieu may vitiate union attractiveness. The ap-
peal of unionization may also reflect the level of economic advancement, of the society as
well. Dani Rodrik, Labor Standard in International Trade: Do They Matter and What do We do
About Them? in EMERGING AGENDA FOR GLOBAL TRADE: HIGH STAKES FOR DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES 36 (Robert A. Lawrence et al. eds., 1996) ("Countries with different sets of values and
at different levels of income will naturally choose different labor-market policies"). Is it
inevitable, therefore, that economic, material, and technological progress creates an inevi-
table need for statutory protection of collective representation at all ranks within the
workforce? On the other hand, it is possible to argue that the "NLRA cements the adver-
sarial model by mandating a united front on labor's side of the table: it obligates the em-
ployer to bargain with the duty certified labor organization representing a majority of its
employees .... [a] duty of fair representation which the Supreme Court imposes in an
effort to deter discrimination by majority .unions against minority interests within unions,
mediates the majority-rule and exclusivity doctrines." Crain & Matheny, supra note 125, at
1555.
126. According to two observers, the "National Labor Relations Act addresses itself
only to the presumed class conflict among employers and employees, ignoring and down-
playing conflicts among employees themselves." Crain & Matheny, supra, at 1543.
127. Id. at 1543.
128. Elementary economic theory posits that economic rent or monopoly rents are the
amount paid to a resource in excess of the resource's opportunity costs. This excess
amount does not induce an increase in supply and likely reflects that the resource possess
market or monopoly power. See generally ARMEN A. ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE
& PRODUCTION, COMPETITION, COORDINATION, & CONTROL 293 (1983).
129. See Lawrence F. Katz & Lawrence H. Summers, Industry Rents: Evidence and Implica-
tions, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMICS ACTIvr.. MICROECONOMIcS 209-10 (1988) (sug-
gesting that capital owners in the United States economy receive few monopoly
[economic] rents. Most economic rents, perhaps 80-85%, apparently accrue to labor.).
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This is likely to be exceptionally true of highly educated or trained
workers. Many professional employees, including many who have
joined unions, share the concern of employers, managers, and mem-
bers of the public that collective bargaining is not only incompatible
with professional values but that unionization governed by principles
of American labor law will impair collegial participation in organiza-
tional decisionmaking. 130 By a significant majority, workers prefer an
employee organization run jointly by employers and management
rather than an independent employee-run organization.' 3 1 Thus, ef-
forts aimed at broadening worker representation grounded in an ad-
versarial view must confront the disquieting prospect "that collective
bargaining [as a form of group action] has become an anachronistic
means of promoting employee interests .... "132 While it is impossible
to know fully whether legal and judicial actions are a cause or an ef-
fect of the diminution of union appeal, when taken together with the
other developments, one conclusion seems likely: the "loss [or reduc-
tion] of legitimacy for unions as the enablers of group action."'33
The primary alternative to the capital versus labor view implies
that the NLRA is premised on conservative as opposed to radical
objectives. This conception of the NLRA is vitally enhanced by under-
standing Taft-Hartley's effect in constraining collective activity, while
concurrently prohibiting activities that were based on class or worker
solidarity.'34 This view implies that the original intent of the NLRA
was attained by simply limiting employers' common law discretion to
fire workers who engaged in an effort to organize, and that the NLRA
was merely designed to lessen putative bargaining disparities between
employers and managers on the one hand, and working class laborers
and other working men and, women located at the bottom end of the
hierarchy on the other. If this perspective is correct, efforts aimed at
broadening the coverage of the statute must confront the following
quandary: Are inclusive interpretative standards defensible on statu-
tory purpose, contextual, or merely aspirational grounds? Justice
Douglas argued that the NLRA separates "workingmen" from manage-
130. See Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining, supra note
16, at 691.
131. See Estreicher, The Dunlop Report, supra note 125, at 118.
132. JamesJ. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L.
Rav. 1563, 1564 (1996) (arguing that both the legislative and judicial branches of govern-
ment have weakened collective bargaining within the workplace).
133. Id.
134. See JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw 47
(1983).
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ment 1 35 On the other hand, Justice Jackson, in writing for the major-
ity, indicated that the purposes of the statute could best be attained
through a relatively broad conception of who "employees" are and a
narrow conception of who is an "employer."136 This approach sepa-
rates most employees from capital but not from management. If sus-
tained, this conclusion makes all or most employees (even those with
discretion) apt for unionization. Yet, this technique seems impossible
to square with either the statute or its legislative history. As Justice
Douglas demonstrates:
When we turn from the Act to the legislative history, we find no
trace of Congressional concern with the problems of supervisory
personnel. The reports and debates are barren of any reference to
them, though they are replete with references to the function of
the legislation in protecting the interests of "laborers" and
"workers." 1 3 7
As one observer correctly notes: 'Justice Douglas .. .believed that to
consider foremen or managerial employees as 'employees' under the
act would lead to a perception that the crucial battle is between work-
ers and owners. This would mean that the basic conflict between these
two groups is one over profits" 138 as part of a class oriented struggle.
As one commentator deftly demonstrates, while worker and per-
haps labor union "class-consciousness was ever present when respond-
ing to the activities of black workers," it was "obviously missing when
responding to the practices of capital [or management]."139 Thus, ex-
pansive class oriented interpretations, which seek to broaden the ap-
plication of the Wagner Act, are dubious. Contemporary workplace
alterations and accompanying worker attitudes place Packard in a light
that reaffirms the absence of a radical class consciousness. Given the
workplace changes since Packard and the absence of support for the
capital versus labor perspective within the statutory language and its
legislative history that Justice Douglas illumines, one should be suspi-
cious of efforts aimed at extending the coverage of the Wagner Act as
part of an ineluctable expansion of class consciousness aimed at im-
periling management prerogatives. Consequently, if Justice Douglas's
view best captures the prevailing mood of Congress and the animating
purpose behind the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, interpretative
135. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 496 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); see alsoJewett, supra note 58, at 1128.
136. See Packard Motor Car Co., 330 U.S. at 489-90.
137. Id. at 498 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
138. ATLESON, supra note 134, at 174.
139. Plass, supra note 27, at 830.
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efforts aimed at extending coverage by limiting the meaning of the
term "independent judgment" should be met with justifiable skepti-
cism. Contemporary worker attitudes, which conceive of a limited role
for adversarial unions, reinforce this view.
2. Organizing Rank and File Workers Without Supervisory
Interference: Establishing Divergences in Worker
Interest?
The Packard majority broadly and inclusively construes the term
"employee" to encompass all who act in the interest of the em-
ployer1 40 despite the fact that the statutory language in section 2(2)
defines the "term 'employer' [to include] any person acting in the
interest of an employer, directly or indirectly .... ,,"41 Evidently, indi-
viduals who can be defined as both employers and employees are in-
cluded within the Wagner Act's organizational privileges.1 42
Consequently, the Court in Packard declined to accept a distinction
between foremen and rank and file workers. More importantly, the
majority failed to recognize that foremen might be governed by inter-
ests that are both distinct and adverse to the interest of the rank and
file.
Contemporary changes in the workplace emphasize that many
workers are mounting the hierarchical ladder. These changes
strengthen and re-emphasize the Act's implicit concern for possible
divergences in interest between workers located at different ranks in
light of the statutory goal of allowing the rank and file to organize
without supervisory interference. Justice Douglas brought this con-
cern to life. He suggested that Congress sought to maintain a proper
line between management and labor and the accompanying diver-
gence in interest, which, among other things, recognizes that supervi-
sory personnel can be an instrument of oppression against working
women and men. 143 Justice Douglas argued that the basic opposing
forces in industry are management and labor, and not capital and la-
bor.144 This perspective diminishes the radical class conscious view-
point discussed in the previous subsection as well as the Packard
majority's approach that is grounded in the assumed yet unproven
140. See Packard, 330 U.S. at 488 (citations ommitted).
141. Id.
142. See id. at 495-96 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
143. See id. at 499 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
144. See id. at 494 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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"unity [between management and rank and file workers] in their com-
mon demands on ownership."1 45 Relying on his uncontroverted un-
derstanding of both the legislative history and the animating purpose
of the statute, Justice Douglas rejected the majority's approach. In-
stead, "[tihe term 'employee' must be considered in the context of
the Act."1 46 Thus those who act for management in formulating and
executing its labor policies are excluded from the Wagner Act's
coverage. 147
The last sixty years of global 148 and American workplace history
have witnessed enormous economic and structural changes. 149 These
changes include decentralized management styles and more flexible
production systems coupled with a significant alteration in the charac-
teristics of the labor force. These alterations are exemplified by an
ascendant managerial, professional, and technical middle class150
whose status, goals, and objectives likely diverge sharply from those of
industrial "workingmen [and workingwomen] and laborers"15' of the
1930s and 1940s and their contemporary counterparts.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 495.
147. See id. at 496.
148. See, e.g., Henrietta L. Moore, The Future of Work, 33 BRITISH J. OF INDUS. REL. 657,
657 (1995). The article states:
Any observer asked to describe the most significant changes of the last three de-
cades would probably cite the increase in the number of women in the waged
labour force, flexible specialization and work from home based on information
technology .... Technological innovations have had a dramatic effect on the
nature and practice of work in many different contexts, and the increasing inte-
gration and globalization of capital are frequently linked to the enhanced ability
to manage information and execute tasks at distance.
Id.
149. See, e.g., Cella & Treu, supra note 24, at 330.
150. See, e.g., id.; HERBERT STEIN & MURRAY Foss, THE NEW ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY 86-88 (1995) (as the industrial composition of jobs has changed in
the United States, blue collar jobs have declined in importance, while white collar jobs
have increased. In addition, over the past thirty years agricultural employment as share of
total employment fell sharply in the United States and much more in other industrialized
countries.).
151. See Packard, 330 U.S. 496-98 (Douglass, J., dissenting).
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Management and bureaucratic power 52 are evidently being
pushed further and further down the employment ranks.1 53 Profes-
sionals are not only animated by professional criteria but also by pro-
fessional standards in the supervision and management of staff.
Whether professional criteria and standards can be intelligibly distin-
guished from management prerogatives remains a contentious ques-
tion. Significantly, one observer declares,
American labor law developed in response to industrial sector col-
lective bargaining and reflects basic assumptions that deviate from
professional values.
The distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of bar-
gaining translates into law the traditionally limited role of workers
in the development of organizational policy.1
54
If true, this claim presents a potential quandary, not only for the ever-
growing number of individuals who can be located within the profes-
sional/supervisory/technical combination and who direct lesser-
skilled workers, but also for those who advocate NLRA protection for
the concerted activity of such individuals alongside the rank and file.
Those who advocate for NLRA protection for the concerted activ-
ity of the professional/supervisory/technical combination alongside
the rank and file likely fail to comprehend that the Act was aimed at
the failure of industry to recognize the right of working class individu-
als to bargain collectively. 155 This position is intensified by the possi-
bility that "the NLRA establishes a representational structure in which
[often] a single union-a 'united front'-represents all workers in
that unit and speaks with a single voice on their behalf. '156
The "union" interest itself is no unitary whole, but instead a com-
plex amalgam of the individual interests of the many actors who
152. Hugh Collins, a leading British labor authority, argues that contracts of employ-
ment produce a dual source subordination, depending upon both market power (eco-
nomic) and social power, and possibly including bureaucratic power (or rule book power).
Bureaucracies impose subordination through hierarchical social structure and disparities
in economic power. See Hugh Collins, Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, and the Contract of
Employment, 15 INDUS. L.J. 1, 1-3 (1986); see also Orro KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR & THE LAW
(1977); Harry Hutchison, Subordinate or Independent, Status or Contract, Clarity or Circularity:
British Employment Law, American Implications, 28 GEORGIA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 55, 65 n.73
(1999).
153. See, e.g., Churgin, supra note 10 at 560-61.
154. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Coll. Barg., supra note 16, at 691-93.
Rabban argues that assumptions derived from the industrial sector limit the eligibility of
professional employees to bargain under the NLRA. He suggests modifications of certain
doctrines that inhibit the ability of professionals to organize. See id. at 692.
155. See Packard, 330 U.S. at 494 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
156. Crain & Matheny, supra note 125, at 1543.
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play on the expanded stage. It is no accident that extensive admin-
istrative procedures are needed to determine the contours of an
"appropriate bargaining unit" and to enforce fiduciary duties for
the protection of minority interests. 157
It is possible that the "united front ideology, enshrined in labor law
through the exclusivity and majority rule doctrines, obscures signifi-
cant material conflicts of interest within the [broadly conceived] work-
ing class"'158 If these above-referenced claims are true, and given the
likely divergence in interest among those who direct lesser-skilled em-
ployees and those who are subject to such direction, the question be-
comes: whose interest prevails and/or whose should prevail? The
inclusion of professionals who responsibly direct others within the
bargaining unit may increase the risk that the interests of working wo-
men and men, as opposed to mid-ranked staff, may suffer. This is a
risk that the Board has apparently recognized. As Professor Feldman
avers,
the Board had always perceived the interests of supervisors before
Taft-Hartley, and of managerial employees both before and after,
as sufficiently distinct from that of the rank and file to prevent
their inclusion in the same bargaining units. The fear that they
might have divided loyalties vis-a-vis the rank and file is a particular
case of the general goal of creating a bargaining unit that mini-
mizes internal conflicts among its constituents, an aim embodied
by the requirement of community of interest. 15 9
3. The Gradual Movement of Workers Up the Ranks of the
Hierarchy in the Mirror of Concern for Possible Divided
Loyalties
From an employer perspective, the possibility of divided loyalties
appears to be among the foremost grounds for opposing statutory cov-
erage of supervisors, actual or alleged. While not everyone admits the
impact of this issue on the terms of the dispute, virtually all observers,
including the NLRB, concede its broad importance. 160 The Packard
majority asserts that "[e]very employee, from the very fact of employ-
ment in the master's business . . . owes to the employer faithful per-
formance of service in his interest, the protection of the employer's
property in his custody or control .... -"161 The majority is stranded by
157. Epstein, supra note 15, at 1398.
158. Crain & Matheny, supra note 125, at 1543.
159. Feldman, Workplace Power, supra note 43, at 549.
160. See, e.g., Brief For NLRB at 24, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815,
2001 U.S. LEXIS 4119 (U.S. May 29, 2000).
161. Packard, 330 U.S. at 488-89.
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its claim that the purpose of the statutory definition of employers was
to establish "respondeat superior, by which a principal is made liable for
the tortious acts of his agent and the master for the wrongful acts of
his servants." 162 As Justice Douglas thoughtfully avers, Congress, in en-
acting the Wagner Act, failed to consider the conspicuous question of
divided loyalties among foremen primarily because it declined to
bring them within the parameters of the Act. 163 Perceptively, he con-
tends that some labor leaders believed "that if those in the hierarchy
above the workers are unionized, they will be more sympathetic with
the claims of those below them"'1 64 as part of a solid phalanx against
capital.165 In other words, mid-ranked staff, who direct lesser-skilled
workers and who represent management's interest might give their
loyalty to those workers as opposed to their employer.
Anxiety over divided loyalties becomes more insistent in the con-
text of the contemporary reordering of the workplace. Critical work-
place changes include increased labor participation by women,1 66
despite historic and-persistent union opposition to their interest;167
higher levels of education and schooling among employees generally;
and a general rise and differentiation in the expectations of work-
ers.1 68 These changes are coupled with innovative management prac-
162. Id. at 489.
163. See id. at 498 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 495 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
165. See id. at 495.
166. See, e.g., Cella & Treu, supra note 24, at 330; STEIN & Foss, supra note 150 at 82-83.
167. See Molly S. McUsic & Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in the Work-
place, 82 IowA L. REv. 1339, 1351 (1997) ("The ill fit between the collective bargaining
regime and the identities of women ... [has] led some to conclude that unions did not,
and perhaps, cannot, represent their interest.").
168. See Cella & Treu, supra note 24, at 330. One study of American workers implies
that they do not accept conventional unions as the best vehicle for the advancement of
their interest.
In their preferences for how an ideal employee organization should be struc-
tured, workers diverge sharply from the union model in some respects-again
reflecting their perceptions that management cooperation is essential. By an over-
whelming 86% to 9% margin, workers want an organization run jointly by em-
ployers and management, rather than an independent, employee-run
organization. By a smaller, but still sizable margin of 52% to 34%, workers want
an organization to be staffed and funded by the company, rather than indepen-
dently through employee contributions.
Estreicher, The Dunlop Report, supra note 125, at 118 n.2 (1996) (citing PRINCETON SURVEY
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, WORKER REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION SURVEY: REPORT ON THE
FINDINGS 49 (1994)). One additional source of changed worker expectations is arguably
the rise of "expressive" individualism, which holds that each person has a unique core of
feelings and intuition that unfolds or is expressed for individuality to be actualized. See
Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as a Cause of
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tices in human resources, greater employee involvement in the joint
handling of organization and technological innovation, which have
found union representatives ill-equipped to react.169 Thus, a larger
percentage of workers today occupy higher ranks in the company hi-
erarchy than typical workers sixty years ago.170 Workers certainly pop-
ulate higher and more skilled ranks than Congress conceived of when
it wrote the NLRA in 1935.171 Indeed, contemporary individuals who
might not necessarily be considered "foremen" sixty years ago are
placed within categories that combine responsibilities requiring some
discretion with responsibilities requiring judgment-professional or
not-that "foremen" rarely possessed sixty years ago. Moreover, this
picture is complicated by the fact that professional/managerial em-
ployees are often subjected to a hands-on work requirement (e.g., RNs
who participate in patient care while directing lesser-skilled Licensed
Practical Nurses ("LPNs")), which continues to blur the traditional
line between management and labor as highly trained, highly edu-
cated, and highly skilled employees evidently traverse this ancient
divide.
Undeniably, "[t] he percentage of workers who [can] be deemed
managerial has grown significantly over the last ten years, since there
has been a move away from traditional blue-collar [and mass-produc-
tion related] jobs towards those positions that require managerial
skills"' 72 located within service oriented industries. Another develop-
ment that blurs the historical distinction between management and
labor is the creation and increasing deployment of worker participa-
Labor's Decline, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVES/
SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 50TH AN-
NUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 41, 41-49 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1998). Among other things,
Estreicher asserts that the principal cause of labor's decline lies in the fact that "model of
employee organization promoted by the labor laws has failed to keep pace with the un-
leashing of competitive forces in product markets as a result of deregulation, technological
advances, and global competition." Estreicher, TheDunlop Report, supra note 125, at 118. By
contrast, there is torrent of academic and media demands for re-unionization. See Leo
Troy, Commentary On Freeman & Rodgers, What do Workers Want? in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTA-
TION IN THE EMERGING WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
(PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 50TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR) 33-34 (Sa-
muel Estreicher ed., 1998).
169. See Celia & Treu, supra note 24, at 335.
170. By 1985, fifty-five percent of the workforce was composed of managerial and pro-
fessional workers. See Churgin, supra note 10, 561.
171. See, e.g., id.
172. Churgin, supra note 10, at 560-61. Churgin states that "[b]etween 1970 and 1985,
there was a seventy percent growth in the managerial and professional workforce; as a
result, by 1985, managerial and professional workers comprised fifty-five percent of the
total workforce." Id. at 561.
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tion programs. 173 Taken as a whole, workforce changes and workplace
developments intensify both the vigorous debate between Justice Jack-
son and Justice Douglas about the precise location of the class di-
vide 174 and the loyalties of those who act in management's interest.
The debate about the location of divided loyalties among workers is
surely more urgent today given that more and more workers are suffi-
ciently skilled, educated, and trained, and who by virtue of such skill,
education, and training, exercise judgment in the interest of the
employer.
"Labor relations and labor law ... have been shaped by underly-
ing assumptions about organizational hierarchies and adversarial rela-
tionships between management and labor in the industrial work
place." 175 Hence, the NLRA "posits a fundamental dividing line be-
tween labor and management. Both the legislative history of the
NLRA and key decisions interpreting it assert that collective bargain-
ing by people on the management side of that line would create intol-
erable divided loyalties."1 76 This remains true despite claims by some
commentators, which imply that unions comprised of professionals,
even supervisory ones, may provide "a way for employees to voice their
concerns and obtain improvements in working conditions, [which]
might actually increase employee loyalty to an organization."' 177 By
contrast, both the NLRB and the courts have conceded "that the as-
sumptions underlying the NLRA apply at best imperfectly to many of
the organizations in which professionals work."178 This determination
attaches greater weight to the framework that Justice Douglas
supplies.
Since workplace changes signify that a larger proportion of work-
ers are located at a higher level in the hierarchy today than during the
1930s and 1940s, the fundamental dividing line between labor and
management materializes differently today than it did sixty years ago.
"Since there has been a move away from traditional blue-collar jobs
towards those positions that require managerial skills,"1 79 employers
173. See id. at 561. Worker participation programs "are designed to provide workers
with more authority, flexibility, and satisfaction in the performance of their jobs." Id. at
562.
174. See Packard Motor Car. Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 493-500 (1947) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
175. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers, supra note 44, at 1778.
176. Id.; see also id. at 1781-1812.
177. Id. at 1779.
178. Id. at 1778.
179. Churgin, supra note 10, at 561.
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likely have increased concern that "management objectives" are car-
ried out by these professional and technical workers without being
impeded by divided or arguably divided loyalties. On the other hand,
the Packard majority declined to accept the possibility that "if foremen
combine to bargain advantages for themselves, they will sometimes be
governed by interests of their own or their fellow foremen, rather by
the company's interest."180 Despite that assertion, Justice Douglas's
dissent, grounded in his inspection of both the Act's legislative history
and purpose, breathes life into the notion that the statute excludes
and should exclude those who participate in implementing and carry-
ing out workplace objectives. 1 ' To do otherwise would expose em-
ployers to the risk of divided loyalties. The enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act makes this determination explicit.
4. Should Congressional Intent Be Found Through Textualism or
Legislative History? Back to the Future
While any reassessment of Packard likely fails to afford sanctuary
from disputes that may have predetermined outcomes, and while it is
impossible to profess "neutrality," it is useful to reconsider the Packard
majority's attachment to textual purity in the mirror of the dissent's
examination of both the statute's legislative history and purpose. This
Article offers the hypothesis that the 1947 United States Supreme
Court provides a perceptive framework for critical review of subse-
quent attempts to interpret or reinterpret the NLRA. The textualist,
statutory purpose, and legislative history assumptions, which are im-
planted in the Packard majority and dissenting opinions, supply a
richly ironic setting for assessing the Supreme Court's decisionmaking
in Kentucky River. This technique allows us to reconsider the "conserva-
tive" versus "liberal" posture of the majority and dissent in Kentucky
River in light of the Packard Court's determination that "it is for Con-
gress, not us, to create exceptions on qualifications at odds with [the
Act's] plain terms."'812 The Packard Court explicitly refused to "make a
lengthy examination of views expressed in Congress while this and
later legislation was pending . . .[as] [t]here is . . .no ambiguity in
this Act to be clarified by resort to legislative history." 183 This verdict
enlarged the coverage of the Act, despite "a long record of inaction,
180. Id. at 490.
181. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. at 493-500 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
182. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 573 (1994) (citing Packard,
330 U.S. 485, 490 (1947)).
183. Packard, 330 U.S. at 492.
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vacillation and division of the NLRB in applying the Act to fore-
men." 184 This approach denies the effect of legislative history and
finds a faint but perhaps unrelated echo in the textualist arguments
that the conservative majority opinion used to narrow NLRA coverage
in both Health Care'85 and in Kentucky River.18 6
In Packard, the liberal majority-those who favored broad NLRA
coverage-established a textualist methodology which explicitly ig-
nored the legislative history and the statutory purpose 187 and the
NLRB's record of inconsistency.188'On the other hand, the dissenting
"conservatives,"-those who conceived the NLRA in narrow terms-
favored an examination of the legislative history as informed by the
contextual purpose of the Act.189 Justice Douglas determined that the
language of the statute is "consistent with a restriction of the Act to
workingmen and laborers"190 and therefore fails to include foremen.
The NLRA was modified in 1947 and therefore its statutory context
and text have changed. Current liberals, adopting the definition of a
supervisor as described in the dissent in Health Care, have embraced
Justice Douglas's earlier dissent on the meaning of relevant elements
of the definition of a supervisor-"in the interest of the employer"-
to determine the current meaning of that phrase, 191 as it interacts
184. Id.
185. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 573 ("[Ilt is for Congress, not us to create exceptions or
qualifications at odds with [the Act's] plain terms.") (citing Packard, 330 U.S. at 490).
186. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 99-1815, slip op. at 13 (U.S. May 29, 2001)
(stating:
What is at issue is the Board's contention that the policy of covering professional
employees under the Act justifies the categorical exclusion of professional judg-
ments from a term, "independent judgment" that naturally includes them. And
further, that it justifies limiting this categorical exclusion to the supervisory func-
tion of responsibly directing other employees. These contentions contradict both
the text and structure of the statue .... ).
187. See generally Packard, 330 U.S. at 493-500 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
this decision altered the industrial philosophy behind the Congressional intent by shifting
the focus from a balancing of management and labor to operating group and stock and
bond holders ownership now will weigh heavily in the labor negotiation process).
188. See id. at 492.
189. See generally id. at 493-500 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (highlighting the act passed in
1935 was written expressly to protect the workers rights of free association and collective
bargaining from repurcussions by those in authority over them, therefore its intention was
never to include foreman or supervisors).
190. Id. at 500.
191. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 573, 596 n.15 (1994). Feld-
man contests this view. See Feldman, Workplace Power, supra note 43, at 540 (stating:
The Health Care dissent also seems to have misunderstood the effect of accepting
the Packard majority's view of "in the interest of the employer," apparently con-
ceding that such a construction would support the result in Health Care. The dis-
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with the phrase "independent judgment." But they refused to em-
brace Justice Douglas's narrow conception of the Act that was derived
from. its legislative history. 192
Justice Douglas's Packard dissent thoroughly illustrates that the
legislative history of the original statute is devoid of any purpose to
bring supervisors within the Act. 193 Evidence from other related legis-
lation that Justice Douglas marshaled demonstrated that when Con-
gress desired to include managerial officials or supervisory personnel
in the category of employees, it did so explicitly. Further, the legisla-
tive history is replete with evidence of Congressional angst for "work-
ers" and "laborers."1 94 The legislative history and a perceptive
understanding of the NLRA's purpose provide Justice Douglas with
ample ammunition to demonstrate that a narrow conception of the
NLRA is consistent with the statute. Given Justice Douglas's determi-
nation that when Congress desired to include managerial or supervi-
sory personnel in the category of individuals subject to statutory
coverage, it did so explicitly, it would be highly ironic, today, to impli-
cate employees with discretionary authority within the amended stat-
ute when they have been explicitly excluded from such coverage. The
NLRA, as altered by the Taft-Hartley Act, should be construed in light
of Justice Douglas's powerful dissent. This gives rise to the possibility
that professional employees who act for management in the execution
of its labor policies and in the responsible direction of others, even
when they also exercise judgment animated by professional standards
may, be justifiably excluded from the statute's coverage.
H. Who is a Supervisor in Light of the Purposes and
Objectives of the NLRA and LMRA?
The modern proliferation of laws can also be explained by the le-
gal technician's complete antipathy to the notion of a doctrinal law
.... For that reason he finds it advisable to enclose the judge or
the administrator in a tighter and tighter technical network .... 195
sent instead questioned whether Congress had adopted this position at all,
thinking it more likely that Justice Douglas's views had prevailed on this issue as
well as on the holding. Douglas believed that the Act "put in the employer cate-
gory all those who acted for management not only in formulating but also in
executing its labor policies.").
192. See Packard, 330 U.S. at 498 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
193. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
194. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
195. ELLUL, supra note 2, at 297-98. For an incandescently accessible explication of
Ellul's concept of law, see Andrew Goddard, Short Abstract, The Life and Thought of
Jacques Ellul With Special Reference To His Writings on Law, Violence, The State and
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A. Genesis of the Debate Over Supervisors
The Act withdrew its protection for supervisors by virtue of the
1947 amendments to the Wagner Act. The NLRB, "now lacks author-
ity either to include supervisors in bargaining units with other employ-
ees or to establish units composed entirely of supervisory
personnel."1 96 Presumably, "the status of supervisor under the Act is
determined by an individual's duties, not by title or job
classification."] 97
The Kentucky River judgment takes place against a backdrop of
insistent claims about the diminution of union power rooted in either
statutory mandates or judicial inspiration. 9 8 This decision cannot be
seen as an isolated event. How one views this decision may depend on
the underlying values and assumptions that are brought to the table.
For instance, some observers, captivated by the romance of collective
action, conceive labor unions and the labor movement as a "robust
engine of collective insurgency against globalization, hierarchy, [and]
unwarranted management power."199 This approach can be seen as
part of a radical,200 inevitable, and historically driven movement,
which inescapably leads to progressive human advancement in the
form of "egalitarianism and solidarity," 20' and "market reconstruc-
tion." 20 2 While this vision has appeal to some, we should also be cogni-
Politics (1995) (unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of Oxford) (on file with the Bod-
leian Library, University of Oxford). As Goddard illumines, the
"droit naturel" [natural law] is a truly human work in which man spontaneously
constructs a system of law even though he lacks explicit theoretical principles to
guide him .... [But] [o]nce conscious of this 'natural law' man begins to develop
juridical theories of natural law to account for it .... This consciousness of the
phenomenon of natural law is the beginning of its destruction.
Id at 171-72.
196. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 6, at 1609. To be sure, "supervisors may
organize although they are not protected by the Act, and employers are not forbidden to
engage in voluntary bargaining with such organizations." Id.
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., George Feldman, Unions, Solidarity, and Class: The Limits of Liberal Labor
Law 15 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 187, 193 (1994) [hereinafter Feldman, Unions, Solidarity,
and Class] (citing cases reflecting the liberal doctrine that labor law only protects unions
insofar as they limit their role to that of representative of employees of an individual em-
ployer and not of all workers in the fight for national class-based justice).
199. Hutchison, Reclaiming the Labor Movement Through Union Dues?, supra note 26, at
448-49 (reviewing such observers).
200. See Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of WagnerAct, supra note 121, at 265 (viewing the
Wagner Act of 1938 as "perhaps the most radical piece of legislation ever enacted by the
United States Congress").
201. Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction, supra note 20, at 2.
202. Id. at 16 ("the New Deal represents a watershed in American law, its validation of
the concept of market reconstruction is one of its most significant contributions).
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zant of the possibility that Fukuyama, like Nietzsche and Kojeve before
him, is worried not simply about the end of history, but ending the
romance of history,20 3 which thus diminishes our "ability to use history
as an object around which we intellectuals can wrap our fantasies." 20 4
Thus labor unions, as instruments of human progress in general and
collective bargaining in particular, must often face thorny facts205 that
are inconsistent with the presumed benefits of unionism. On the
other hand, some observers come to the table, after reviewing the evi-
dence, with the view that the NLRA in both its original conception
and as amended, is a fairly "conservative" document with limited am-
bition and bereft of radical potential. 20 6 Still others suggest it was sim-
ply a mistake that could be corrected by repeal. 20 7
All observers, radical or not, must acknowledge that ascendant
union power in the 1930s and 1940s faced an employer 2°8 and Con-
203. See RICHARD RORTY. TRUTH AND PROGRESS: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 231 (1998).
204. Id.
205. Among the thorniest facts is the dramatic decline in union density coupled with
worker attitudes that are not conducive to unionization and group action within the pa-
rameters of collective bargaining.
206. A number of academics have suggested that the NLRA in its original conception
was simply too timid a vehicle for the implementation of progress-which provides
grounds to challenge the viability of the NLRA as a vehicle for societal transformation and
human progress. As thus conceived, the NLRA was merely a reform vehicle, which was
necessary to save the country from more radical solution such as communism. See, e.g.,
Feldman, Unions, Solidarity and Class, supra note 198, at 197. Whether this conception has
any continuing viability remains a debatable question. See Epstein supra note 15, at 1406
(arguing against the special privileges and immunities that New Deal legislation confers on
union and further arguing that where union are necessary, the can emerge in any volun-
tary situation in a form less formal and less adversarial than it is today). See also id. at
1407-08 (arguing for a theory of individual self-interest under which we can predict that
unions and their members (like employers) will press for their maximum advantage after
the passage of the Act as well as before). Other observers contend that the Wagner Act was
simply an important effort to appropriately channel labor protests in a way that would
preserve the existing political and economic order. See Patrick M. Kuhlmann, Comment,
The Enigma of NLRA Section 2(11): The Supervisory Exclusion and the Case of the Charge Nurse,
2000 Wis. L. REv. 157, 161 (2000). In reality, Kuhlmann accessibly "simplifies a considera-
ble body of nuanced and challenging scholarship working from the premise that the NLRA
was an effort to deflect labor insurgency and stabilize the social order." Id. at 161 n.25.
207. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 15, at 1388-95 (arguing against the soundness of the
statute itself which radically changed the nature of labor negotiations).
208. As one perceptive observer avers: "Buoyed by their success in organizing and by
the erosion of the business community's moral authority, unions sought not only a bigger
piece of the economic pie, but also a voice in decisions regarding personnel policies, tech-
nology, capital disposition, and the process of production-traditionally the sole preroga-
tive of management." Kuhlmann, supra note 206, at 162.
This vision of expansive labor union power reached its apex when John L. Lewis
conducted two prolonged and devastating strikes among coal miners during
World War II, when, in response to the postwar deregulation of wages and prices
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gressional backlash against both the Board and court decisionmaking
which ostensibly enlarged union power. 20 9 The success of this em-
ployer-led reaction coupled with the decline in union density has
sparked still another reaction whose embers continue to burn. Aca-
demic fire 210 is tenaciously aimed at what has been called the "slave"
labor act.21' No rational observer can contend that the Taft-Hartley
Amendments were designed to strengthen unions or broaden the
scope of coverage despite the LMRA's guarantee of protection for
professionals. The 1947 amendments reflect Congressional and em-
ployer opposition to the growing militancy and strength of organized
labor in the late 1930s and 1940s.2 12 Congress shifted the emphasis of
federal labor law from a circumscribed, even conservative, 213 scheme
that concentrated on the protection of employees' rights to organize
and engage in concerted economic activities, while simultaneously
constraining the power of employers to a more balanced approach,
which placed certain restrictions on unions while guaranteeing cer-
tain freedoms of speech and conduct to employers and individual
workers.214 Driven by a desire to secure the undivided loyalties of mi-
nor supervisory employees, employers in a number of industries
in August 1945, major unions immediately demanded huge raises, thirty percent
and more . . . [and] union leaders ... threatened to shut the country down.
Hutchison, Reclaiming the Labor Movement Through Union Dues, supra note 26, at 451.
209. See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
210. See, e.g., Craver, supra note 23, at 1620; Lichtenstein, supra note 124, at 764; Feld-
man, Unions Solidarity, and Class, supra note 198, at 193. Academic fire is also aimed at the
courts. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 132, at 1564. Among the court decisions, which have
inspired the most passion, are: Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 531-41 (1992) (hold-
ing that nonemployee union access rights need not be accommodated unless the work-
place is otherwise inaccessible); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 106-12
(1956). See, e.g., ATLESON, supra note 134, at 93 (condemning court decisions which stress
property rights by limiting union access to workers). But cf Harry G. Hutchison, Through
the Pruneyward Coherently: Resolving the Collision of Private Property Rights and Nonemployee
Union Access Claims, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 5-7 (1994) (arguing in favor of access limitations).
211. See Lichtenstein, supra note 124, at 765 (stating:
Proponents of the Taft-Hartley Act sought to achieve far more than the mere
reform of the labor law; instead the law was part of a larger contestation in which
the entire structure . . . was involved. The Taft-Hartley law stands like a fulcrum
upon which the entire New Deal order teetered. Before 1947 it was possible to
imagine a continuing expansion and vitalization of the New Deal impulse. After
that date, however, labor and the left were forced into an increasingly defensive
posture.).
212. See Kuhlmann, supra note 206, at 162.
213. See St. Antoine, supra note 119, at 2205.
214. See Hutchison, Reclaiming the Labor Movement Through Union Dues?, supra note 26, at
451 (citations omitted).
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sought,215 and successfully persuaded Congress to exclude "supervi-
sors from coverage by the Act."2 16
Two provisions are placed at the center of this firestorm: "section
2, defining 'employee' to exclude supervisors, and section 14(a), ex-
empting employers from the duty to consider supervisors as employ-
ees under any law relating to collective bargaining. '" 217  One
commentator avers that the "task of identifying supervisors has been
described as an 'aging but . . . persistently vexing problem.'"218
"Whether or not a person enjoys supervisory status will determine,
among other matters, that person's right to vote in a union election,
entitlement to section 7 rights, and ability to bind the employer by
statements and actions."219 Whether supervisors and managers are ex-
cluded is critical because if every employee is a bargaining unit mem-
ber within the meaning of the NLRA, then who personifies the
employer's prerogatives and interests?
Section 14(a) provides: "Nothing herein shall prohibit any indi-
vidual employed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a mem-
ber of a labor organization,"220 but "no employer subject to this Act
shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors
as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relat-
ing to collective bargaining."221 While the statute excludes supervi-
sors, it offers limited guidance on who are supervisors, 222 and
215. See Kuhlmann, supra note 206, at 162 (citation omitted).
216. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 6, at 1608. Before the 1947 Amendments,
the NLRB "excluded supervisory personnel from bargaining units that included employees
subject to their supervision. An exception was made in cases involving an established his-
tory in the industry of including supervisors in such units." Id. (citing Packard Motor Car Co.,
61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945)), enforced, 157 F.2d 80 (6th Cir.1946), affd 330 U.S. 485 (1947). The
Board did establish bargaining units composed entirely of supervisory workers and re-
quired employers to bargain with the representatives of such units. See Packard Motor Car
Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
217. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 6, at 1608.
218. Id. (citing NLRB v. Security Guard Serv., 384 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1967)).
219. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 6, at 1608.
220. LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1974). The LMRA is the Labor Management Relations
Act which is commonly referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act.
221. LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1974).
222. The statute states:
[T]he term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with
the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1974).
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accordingly, the actual determination of supervisory status seems sub-
ject to endless technical determination and "inconsistent treatment of
supervisors under the Wagner Act."2 23
B. Triggering the Supervisory Exclusion Pursuant to NLRB
Criteria
The "status of supervisor under the Act is determined by an indi-
vidual's duties, not by title or job classification. '" 224 Compliance with
all of the listed criteria in section 2(11) is not essential in order to be
classified as a supervisor. Compliance with one factor is sufficient.
While the "enumerated functions of a supervisor are listed disjunc-
tively, the statute expressly insists that a supervisor (1) have authority
(2) to use independent judgment (3) in performing such supervisory
functions (4) in the interest of management. '" 225 It seems vital that a
"supervisor" must have "the power to act as an agent of the employer
in relations with other employees and to exercise independent judg-
ment of some nature."226 One pertinent question is whether the defi-
nition of supervisor was meant to exclude only those individuals who
are "vested with such genuine management prerogatives as the right
to hire or fire, discipline, or make effective recommendations with
respect to such actions"227 or whether the definition also excludes
those who responsibly direct lesser-skilled workers.
The "separation of 'supervisors' excluded from the Act's com-
pass, from 'professionals' sheltered by the Act is a task Congress com-
mitted to the National Labor Relations Board . . . in the first
instance."228 Conspicuously, as Professor Rabban demonstrates,
NLRB decisions under the original Wagner Act and the legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley Amendments clearly reveal what many
recent scholars and jurists surprisingly claim is false or unprovable:
the managerial exclusion, derived from the assumption of a divi-
223. Churgin, supra note 10, at 574-75. This inconsistency is compounded or abetted
by virtue of the existence of section 2(12), which affirms that professionals are "employees"
and thus serves as the basis of their right to organize within the meaning of the NLRA.
Section 12 states in pertinent part: "The term 'professional employee' means-(a) any
employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as op-
posed to routine .. . (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment."
LMRA, 29 USC § 152(12) (1974).
224. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 6, at 1609.
225. Id. at 1610 (citing NLRB v. Security Guard, 384 F.2d, 143, 145 (5th Cir. 1967)).
226. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 6, at 1610.
227. S. REP. No. 105, at 4 (1947) (quoted in NLRB v. Security Guard Serv., 384 F.2d
143, 147 (5th Cir. 1967)).
228. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 585, 599 (1994) (GinsburgJ.,
dissenting).
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sion between management and labor in a capitalist system, is built
into the NLRA. 2 2 9
"The treatment of supervisors became the focus of this debate from
the initial interpretations of the Wagner Act through the passage of
the Taft-Hartley Amendments. By excluding supervisors while cover-
ing professionals, the Taft-Hartley Amendments produced substantial
litigation over when professional employees may become excluded
managers or supervisors."230 For some time, the Board has exper-
ienced "difficulty in developing appropriate distinctions among these
categories of employees." 231
When, and if, the Board's approach to resolving the tension be-
tween excluded supervisors and included professionals is both ra-
tional and consistent with Act, its decision is entitled to deference. 23 2
In judging whether the Board's decision meets this standard, it is use-
ful to briefly inspect the Board's current technique. Presently, the
Board concentrates on "the individual's authority to hire or discharge
in determining his or her status as a supervisor.'" 233 "Presence of such
authority establishes supervisory status."2 34 On the other hand, where
RN team leaders, for example, do not assign, direct, discipline, or
evaluate using independent judgment, they are not supervisors ac-
cording to the Board.235 Licensed Practical Nurses have been found to
be supervisors where they engage in an evaluation of nursing assist-
ants and where such evaluations are used as the basis of merit in-
creases.2 36 Moreover, LPNs at a nursing home have been found to be
supervisors where they are frequently the most senior staff present
and they are responsible for maintaining the overall operations of the
home,2 37 while LPNs who primarily engage in direct patient care with
limited "charge" duties that are routine and which do not require "in-
dependent judgment" are not supervisors according to the NLRB.238
229. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers From Covered Professionals Under the NLRA,
supra note 44, at 1781.
230. Id. at 1782.
231. Id.
232. See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 598-99.
233. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 6, at 1610.
234. Id.
235. See VencorHospital-Los Angeles, 328 N.L.R.B. 1136 (1999) (cited in THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAw 2000, ONE-YEAR SUPPLEMENT 144-45 (Christopher T. Hexter et. al. eds., 2000).
236. See Beverly Enterprises-Mass. Inc. dba Cape Cod Nursing & Retirement Home, 329
N.L.R.B. No. 28 (1999) (citing THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 6, at 144).
237. See Beverly Enterprises, W. Va., Inc. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 6, at 144).
238. See Beverley Enterprises, Va., Inc. v. NLRB, 136 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 1998).
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Outside of the health care field, the Board has concentrated on
whether the independent judgment is sourced in technical skills 23 9 or
experience, 240 both of which lead to the exercise of limited discretion
to direct other employees in accordance with employer specified stan-
dards. 241 Without "independent judgment," the employee fails to trig-
ger supervisory status.2 42 The Board has evidently applied these
principles to professional employees in a variety of fields. In Golden
West Broadcasters-KTLA v. Directors Guild of America, Inc.,243 the Board
found that "'directors' at remote television broadcasts were not super-
visors. ' 244 This determination was premised on the conclusion "that
supervisory status 'turns not only on whether [an employee has] the
authority, in the interest of the employer, inter alia, responsibly to di-
rect other employees, but also on the nature and extent of that au-
thority."' 245 "Thus, 'an employee with special expertise or training
who directs or instructs another in the proper performance of his
work for which the former is professionally responsible is not thereby
rendered a supervisor' ... ."246 "This is so," the Board explained,
"even when the more senior or more expert employee exercises some
independent discretion where, as here, such discretion is based upon
special competence or upon specific articulated employer policies. '247
Whether such an expansive conception of professionals and such a
cramped conception of independent judgment are defensible is taken
up more directly in the next section.
If we return to the health care arena, it seems plain that the
Board is predisposed to hold that nurses in particular "are not supervi-
sors and may, therefore, organize with the protection of the
239. See, e.g., Arlington Elec., Inc., 166 L.R.R.M. 1049 (2000) ("electrician did not exer-
cise 'independent judgment' where he provided direction and guidance to other employ-
ees based on his experience and craft skill and pursuant to a [a statutory supervisor's]
project plans") (cited in Brief for Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. at 18 n.5, NLRB v. Ky. River
Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001)).
240. See, e.g., Somerset Welding & Steel, Inc., 291 N.L.R.B. 913, 914 (1988) (employees
who have "responsibility to direct the work" "based on their higher level of skill and greater
seniority" "do not exercise independent judgment" when they "make sure [assignments]
are completed to predetermined specification") (cited in Brief for Ky. River Cmty. Care,
Inc. at 18 n.6, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001)).
241. See Brief for Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. at 18, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc.,
No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
242. See id.
243. 215 N.L.R.B. 760, 762 & n.4 (1974).
244. Brief for National Labor Relations Board at 19, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care,
Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
245. Id. at 19-20.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 20.
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NLRA."248 As Motley suggests, the NLRB seems driven by the "policy
concerns behind [section] 2(12) and its inclusion of professionals,
while in turn ignoring the policy concerns of [section] 2(11) and its
exclusion of supervisors. '249 This is especially true where the person-
nel at issue are all technically equal and have similar training and edu-
cation. 250 On the other hand, "the [United States] Courts of Appeals
have split on the question of how much deference should be accorded
to NLRB determinations .... Whether certain kinds of nurses and
LPNs are supervisors within the meaning the NLRA 'continues to be a
highly contentious and fact-intensive issue."' 251 In Health Care, the Su-
preme Court concentrated on the NLRB's "patient care" technique
for determining whether the individual at issue acted in the interest of
the employer.25 2 The Supreme Court rejected this technique, which
was evidently designed to maximize the number of employees eligible
for coverage, but invited additional NLRB attempts to limit the reach
of the supervisory exception. Following its reversal in Health Care, the
NLRB insisted that nurses were not supervisors chiefly on grounds
that nurses in particular failed to exercise independent, as distin-
guished from professional judgment. Whether this tactic constitutes a
principled distinction from the analysis and judgment provided by
Health Care remains doubtful. Before inspecting the Board's post-
Health Care independent judgment analysis, this Article concentrates
on the Health Care decision itself.
C. Health Care as a Precursor to the Focus on "Independent
Judgment" Analysis?
At issue in Health Care was the Board's false dichotomy between
authority exercised "in the interest of the patient" and authority exer-
cised "in the interest of the employer." The Taft-Hartley Act excludes
248. Jennifer Claire Leisten, Note, Independent Judgment Day: The Fourth Circuit Deems
Nurses to be Supervisors in Glenmark Associates v. NLRB, 78 N.C. L. REV. 508 (2000).
249. Jonathan Edward Motley, Note, Grandmothers and Teamsters: How the NLRB's New
Approach to the Supervisory Status of Charge Nurses Ignores the Reality of the Nursing Home, 73 IND.
L.J. 711, 738 (1997).
250. See id.
251. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 6, at 143; see, e.g., Integrated Health Servs.
Mich. v. NLRB, 191 F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that staff nurses who have the author-
ity to responsibly direct and discipline nursing assistants were supervisors); NLRB v. Hil-
liard Dev. Corp., 187 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that charge nurses are not
supervisors where judgment exercised by them in assigning and directing employee is in-
distinguishable from judgment that professional nurses routinely exercise).
252. See NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 577-78 (1994).
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from NLRA coverage "any individual employed as a supervisor. '" 253
The Court accepted the Board's three part test.254 To restate, supervi-
sor status requires affirmative answers to three questions: (1) Does the
employee possess authority to engage in any one of the twelve listed
activities? (2) Does the use of such authority require independent
judgment as opposed to authority that is routine or clerical in nature?
and (3) Does the employee hold authority in the interest of the em-
ployer?255 The Health Care decision only addresses the third
question. 256
In managing this third question, the Board's technique was prob-
lematic. The Board "admits that it has interpreted [in the interest of
the employer] in a unique manner .... The Board has held that a
'nurse's direction of less-skilled employees, in the exercise of profes-
sional judgment incidental to the treatment of patients, is not author-
ity exercised in the interest of the employer,"' 257 but rather is
authority exercised in the interest of the profession. This finding ap-
parently builds on prior cases where the Board suggested that
[n]urses who incidentally direct or assign aides while providing
care to patients ... derive their authority from their status as pro-
fessionals. [258] As such, the danger of divided loyalties is not pre-
sent in such cases .... [Because] [t] heir professional responsibility
to provide adequate care gives nurses an independent interest in
seeing that patients are treated well so they are not [therefore, obli-
gated] to choose between their interests and the interests of their
employer. 259
No statutory language supports this technique. On the contrary,
the fear of divided loyalty relates less to "professional judgment" and
more to supervisory responsibility, including the direction of lesser-
skilled, less experienced subordinates. In fact, "[t]he Board's interpre-
tation... is similar to an approach the Board took, and [the Supreme
Court] rejected in NLRB v. Yeshiva University"260 In Yeshiva University,
the Court discarded the contention that faculty members who formu-
late and effectuate management policies were nonetheless included
within the contours of NLRA coverage by virtue of the allegation that
"faculty authority was 'exercised in the faculty's own interest rather
253. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1995).
254. See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 574.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. Id. (citation omitted).
258. Kuhlmann, supra note 206, at 169.
259. Id. at 169-70.
260. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 576. (citations omitted).
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than in the interest of the university. "' 261 The NLRB's reasoning fared
no better in Health Care than it did in Yeshiva.
As in Yeshiva, the Board has created a false dichotomy-in this
case, a dichotomy between acts taken in connection with patient
care and acts taken in the interest of the employer. That dichot-
omy [made] no sense. Patient care is the business of a nursing
home, and it follows that attending to the needs of the nursing
home patients, who are the employer's customers, is in the interest
of the employer.262
Consequently, the Court rejected the Board's definition "of 'in the
interest of the employer' because it rendered portions of the statutory
definition in section 2(11) meaningless, specifically, the phrase
'responsibly to direct.' "263
While the Court's ultimate holding remains justifiable, it drifts
from the defensible textual logic of its position to assert that Packard
Motors provided a definitive explication of the meaning of the phrase
"in the interest of the employer" as contained in the Wagner Act.2 64
The Court upholds the respondeat superior logic of the Packard Motors
decision. It stated "[c]onsistent with the ordinary meaning of the
phrase, the Court in Packard Motor determined that acts within the
scope of employment or on the authorized business of the employer
are 'in the interest of the employer.'"265 That determination arguably
includes all employees including, for instance, the vice-president of
production, the chief executive officer as well as other employee activ-
ity. Finding that Congress left no indication that it intended a differ-
ent meaning of "in the interest of the employer" when it defined
supervisors in 1947, the definition of "in the interest of the employer,"
which is derived from the Packard Motors majority, prevails.
This conclusion is dubious, as Justice Ginsburg points out in her
dissent. The better view is that section 2(11) of Taft-Hartley was in-
tended to overturn and not sustain the Packard Motors majority's con-
ception of employment within the meaning of the NLRA. "Thus it is
more likely that Congress was taken by Justice Douglas's dissenting
view that 'acting in the interest of the employer' fits employees who
act for management 'not only in formulating but also in executing its
labor policies."' 266 On the other hand, while Justice Ginsburg is surely
261. Id. at 577.
262. Id. at 577.
263. Brief for Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. at 12, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No.
99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
264. See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 578.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 596 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Winter 2002]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
right in claiming that the phrase "in the interest of the employer" was
intended to narrow, not to expand the category "supervisor,"2 67 she,
like the Board, ignores the fact that the supervisory exclusion was
meant to narrow, not broaden coverage under the Act. Language
meant to narrow the NLRA confers an affirmative obligation upon the
NLRB and the courts to construe the germane language (section
2 (11)) consistent with both the text of the statute as well as its animat-
ing spirit. The Board's difficulty is further compounded by the dis-
sent's admirable common sense admission that "most professionals
supervise to some extent,"268 while simultaneously asserting that
"the... definition of supervisor had been framed with a view to assur-
ing that 'the employees . . .excluded from the coverage of the act
[would] be truly supervisory.' ",269 The Health Care majority, in effect,
vindicates both components of the dissent's assessment without agree-
ing with the dissent's conclusion-thus, true supervisory authority ex-
ercised in connection with -patient care is "in the interest of the
employer." Those who exercise such authority cannot use the statu-
tory language which protects professionals to convert exclusionary su-
pervisory status into inclusionary professional standing.
The Board consequently was without statutory authority to re-
solve the "tension between the Act's exclusion of [supervisory and]
managerial employees and its inclusion of 'professionals.' "' 270 Corre-
spondingly, the court rejected the Board's claim that it is best situated
to ascertain the danger of divided loyalty, as nonstatutory. 271 On the
contrary, "the statute gives nursing home owners the ability to insist
on the undivided loyalty of its nurses notwithstanding the Board's im-
pression that there is no danger of divided loyalty." 272 The Court de-
termined that "[w]hether the Board proceeds through adjudication
or rulemaking, the statute must control the Board's decision, not the
other way around."2 73 Since the NLRB's technique was inconsistent
with the statute, its technique remains unenforceable. Parenthetically
and crucially, the Court maintained
that the use of independent judgment is distinct from a mere exer-
cise of professional expertise. Thus, when an employer grants to an
employee the authority to use judgment in the management or
267. Id.
268. Id. at 588.
269. Id. at 587.
270. Id. at 581.
271. See id. at 580-81.
272. Id. at 581.
273. Id. at 580.
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evaluation of other employees, that judgment is independent judg-
ment under the NLRA, not [merely] the exercise of professional
expertise. 274
In sum, the United States Supreme Court "held that the Board had
mistakenly applied a special test of supervisory status for the health
care industry based on an incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'in
the interest of the employer.' " 2 75
D. The Board's Nimble Response to Health Care
As one observer adroitly notes, "[d]espite its emphatic rejection
of the Board's ... analysis, the Court emphasized the limited nature
of its holding. The decision was confined to the Board's application of
the statute in nursing cases." 2 76 The Court issued an invitation to the
Board for further innovative adjudication in the form of this state-
ment: "In applying [section] 2(11) in other industries, the Board on
occasion reaches results reflecting a distinction between authority aris-
ing from professional knowledge and authority encompassing front-
line management prerogatives. '" 277 The Court maintained its holding
"casts no doubt on Board or court decisions interpreting parts of [sec-
tion] 2(11) other than the specific phrase 'in the interest of the em-
ployer."' 2 78 This judgment and accompanying dicta imply that a
decision premised on the absence of "independent judgment" by ei-
ther nurses or other professionals would not foreclose the Board from
concluding "supervisory status has not been demonstrated." 279
The NLRB has continued to exclude nurses from the category of
supervisors,280 as the -Board maintains "its commitment to keeping
charge nurses within the purview of the NLRA. ''28 1 The Board
achieved this policy driven result by applying "its 'traditional analysis'
to the nursing profession .... [This analysis supplies] two rhetorical
formulations of the 'independent judgment' prong."282 The Board
first classified "certain types of duties as 'routine' and 'clerical' and
not requiring the use of 'independent judgment.' Second, it decreed
274. Beverly Enters., Va., Inc. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Health Care, 511 U.S. at 583).
275. Brief for Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. at 3, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No.
99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
276. Kuhlmann, supra note 206, at 171.
277. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 583.
278. Id. at 583.
279. Id.; see also Kulhmann, supra note 206, at 171.
280. See Kuhlmann, supra note 206, at 172.
281. Id.
282. Id,
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that an employee does not exercise 'independent judgment' if his au-
thority to supervise subordinates derives from his professional exper-
tise rather than his identification with management. '" 283 In essence,
the Board substantially narrowed the reach of the supervisory exclu-
sion premised on its deduction that "Congress had taken 'great care'
to ensure that employees excluded from coverage 'be truly supervi-
sory.' "284 Congress essayed, so we are told, to differentiate between
true supervisors who are vested with "genuine management preroga-
tives," and "straw bosses, lead men and set-up men" who are protected
by the NLRA even though they perform "minor supervisory duties. '285
Plainly, professionals who direct less-skilled workers in the perform-
ance of their duties cannot exercise genuine management
prerogatives.
The Board's technique may allow, but does not compel, its deter-
mination that LPNs who direct certified nurses aides in terms of the
assignment and reassignment of work are not supervising within the
meaning of section 2(11); instead, they are incidentally directing the
work of less skilled employees. In Glenmark Assoc. v. NLRB,286 for in-
stance, the Board asserted the following justification for its distinction:
"Skilled workers cannot be regarded as supervisors simply because
they make decisions about their work that might also define what
needs to be done by their assistants. '287 The NLRB adheres to this
claim despite conceding that some aspects of supervision were pre-
sent. For example, clear evidence exists that the charge nurses en-
sured that staff coverage per shift was adequate by either calling in
non-scheduled staff or by reorganizing the coverage of the staff that
was present at a facility and held disciplinary responsibilities. 288 Highly
skilled employees who are professionals and who also responsibly di-
rect others cannot be supervisors within the meaning of the NLRA
because their judgment, regardless of however independent or mana-
gerial, is grounded in professional standards. According to the Board,
283. Id. See Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 3, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty.
Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001) (stating under "its 'traditional analysis' an
employee does not exercise the independent judgment that triggers supervisory status
under the Act when the employee exercises ordinary professional or technical judgment in
directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in accordance with employer-specified
standards.").
284. Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B., 717, 725 (1996).
285. Id (citing S. RP. No. 105, at 4-5 (1947)); See also Brief for the NLRB at 31, NLRB
v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
286. 147 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1998).
287. Id. at 340 (citation ommitted).
288. See id. at 337.
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they are "merely sharing their knowledge and expertise with their
lesser skilled co-workers." 289 Sharing knowledge, expertise, and direc-
tion with lesser skilled coworkers, who are commonly referred to as
subordinates, apparently cannot constitute supervision as the Board
conceives the term. This industry is simply part of the "NLRB's contin-
uing effort to modify the plain language of [section] 2(11)."290
Significantly, Glenmark catalogs the Board's, post-Health Care ef-
forts to escape the language of the Taft-Hartley Act.2 9 1 Such a record
implies a controlling predisposition. To be sure, "[p]rofessionals are
by definition highly skilled employees whose jobs require the use of
independent judgment"292 and "[n] ot all professionals.., are supervi-
sors. Professionals routinely use their skills and exercise independent
judgment in the performance of their own responsibilities. '2 3 The
Court nonetheless reverses the Board because the charge nurses exer-
cise management prerogatives.2 94 This decision vindicates the dissent of
Board Member Cohen in two other post-Health Care cases,29 5 which
arise out of similar facts. In one of them, Cohen "contended, '. . . that
the individual's actions are based on the thought processes of that
individual, rather than on some outside force or person.' Thus, the
[Board] majority's dichotomy between authority derived from identi-
fication with management and authority stemming from professional
training had no basis in the statutory definition." 296 While Cohen's
argument remains sound, and despite "repeated admonitions to the
contrary,"297 the Board has persistently applied its policy bias (its so-
called traditional analysis) 298 in favor of excluding charge nurses from
the category of supervisors299 to post-Health Care adjudication. 300 The
Kentucky River case supplies an additional rebuke.
289. Id. at 340.
290. Id. at 339 n.8.
291. See id. (See, e.g., Beverly Enters., Va. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 290 (4th Cir. 1999);
Caremore, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1997); Beverly Enters., Penn. v. NLRB, 129
F.3d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Providence Alaska Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 121 F.3d 548 (9th Cir.
1997)).
292. Glenmark Assocs. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d at 340 (4th Cir. 1998).
293. Id.
294. See id.
295. See Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. 717, 736 (1996) (Cohen, Member, dissenting);
Nymed, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 806, 814 (1996) (Cohen, Member, dissenting).
296. Kuhlmann, supra note 206, at 176 (citing Nymed, 320 N.L.R.B 806, 815 (1996)
(Cohen, Member, dissenting), and Providence, 320, N.L.R.B. 717, 736-37 (1996) (Cohen,
Member, dissenting)).
297. Caremore, 129 F.3d at 371.
298. See Kuhlmann, supra note 206, at 172.
299. See id at 179.
Winter 2002] INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
III. Toward a Critical Analysis of Kentucky River
A. The Argument
The National Labor Relations Board's Kentucky Rive7301 decision
is unexceptional. The employer cheerfully "admits its refusal to bar-
gain but attacks the validity of the certification on the basis of the
Board's determination in the representation proceeding that the Re-
spondent is an employer within the meaning of the section 2(2) of the
Act."302 Since the employer refused to bargain with the Board-defined
bargaining unit, the NLRB sought enforcement before the court of
appeals.30 3 The court responded directly:
This is another in an increasing number of cases involving the
question whether nurses are supervisors within the meaning of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (11), in which we are
required to direct the National Labor Relations Board to apply the
law as this court has announced it, and not as the Board would
prefer it to be.304
Factually, the Board maintains that the employer is a nonprofit organ-
ization that operates mental health facilities in Kentucky. 305 One facil-
ity, the Caney Creek Rehabilitation Center operates as a transitional
residential center for mentally ill individuals as they attempt to de-
velop sufficient skills for independent living.306 This center employs
twenty rehabilitation counselors, forty rehabilitation assistants, six reg-
istered nurses and three licensed practical nurses.307 Each of the four
treatment units is staffed with five rehabilitation counselors and ten
rehabilitation assistants.308 The RNs and LPNs supply medical services
to residents throughout the units. 30 9 Two RNs and one LPN generally
work on each of three shifts, although occasionally only one RN works
on the third shift.31 0 The Caney Creek unit establishes a treatment
plan for each resident that contains rehabilitative goals and specifies
300. See id at 177.
301. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
302. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., and Ky. State District Council of Carpenters, 156
L.R.RM. 1159 (1996).
303. See Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. v. NLRB, 193 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 1999).
304. Id. at 447.
305. See Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 3, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty.
Care Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
306. See id.
307. See id. at 4.
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. See id.
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activities designed to accomplish those objectives. 311 Because all of the
residents receive some form of medication, the treatment plan in-
cludes a medical component.3 12 The rehabilitation counselors and
RNs participate in the formulation of the plans, but the unit coordina-
tor and the resident's psychiatrist must approve each resident's treat-
ment plan.3 13 The RNs work with and, according to the NLRB, only
occasionally direct less-skilled employees to deliver services in accor-
dance with the employer specified plans.3 14 Thus they fit within the
post-Health Care framework in which the Board decides that highly
skilled individuals who direct lesser skilled workers in conjunction
with professionally mandated standards could not be supervisors
within the meaning of the NLRA. Even if supervision or the responsi-
ble direction of lesser-skilled employees occurs, such activity must be
seen as routine and customary and not independent.
While the NLRB's brief concedes that during part of the second
and the entire third shift and on weekends neither the administrator
nor any other stipulated supervisor is physically present at Caney
Creek, the Board stresses that a stipulated supervisor is always "on call"
at those times. 315 The NLRB presumes that the availability of on call
persons deprives RN building supervisors of supervisory functions
since the Board stresses that the
same RN may be an ordinary nurse on one day of the week and the
building supervisor on another day of the week. Moreover, the RNs
on the second shift are not notified as to when during the shift
they assume their building-supervisor responsibilities. When serv-
ing as building supervisor, an RN receives no extra
compensation. 316
The Board concedes "[a]s building supervisors, the RNs have
some additional duties. 317 But the Board concentrates on the RNs'
power or responsibility to obtain "needed help if for some reason a
shift is not fully staffed."318 This includes pulling employees from one
unit to another, seeking volunteers to work an extra shift (since they
lack authority to compel employees to work under the threat of disci-
311. See Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 4, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty.
Care Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id. at 4-5.
315. See id. at 6.
316. Id. (citations omitted).
317. See Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 6, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty.
Care Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
318 Id.
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pline), telephoning off duty employees, and writing up employees
who do not comply with a decision to shift staff between units. 31 9 Ap-
parently, such activities either are routine in nature or arise out the
RNs professional remit and thus do not qualify as independent judg-
ment pursuant to NLRB analysis.
Predictably, the employer's (Kentucky River Community Care's)
view of the facts320 differs radically from the Board's perspective. The
employer emphasized that the "LPNs are supervised by and must com-
ply with directions of the RNs, particularly with respect to administer-
ing medication to residents and ensuring that proper documentation
is done."' 321 Notably, this case differs from a hospital setting in which
the Board often asserts that there is little difference in training, expe-
rience, or education between charge nurses and staff nurses. 322 Here,
the six RNs possess greater skill and more responsibility in directing
lesser skilled individuals. At all times between 3:30 P.M. and 7:00 A.M.,
Monday through Friday, "[t]he RNs also direct the 40 rehabilitation
assistants on how to deal with unusual situations that arise when the
rehabilitation counselors are not present. '3 23 "[WIhenever residents
go on home visits or leave the building, the rehabilitation assistant
must report their departure and return to the RN." 324 In addition,
"whenever a resident starts acting up or appears out-of-sorts or feels
ill, the rehabilitation assistant involved must report the situations di-
rectly to the RN on duty and follow the RN's instructions as to what
action to take. '3 25 The employer's argument that the six RNs must
responsibly direct using independent judgment is buttressed by the
proof that:
During the second and third shifts, throughout each weekend, on
holidays, and in all emergencies, the RNs are designated Building
Supervisors. This amounts to 75% of the total hours in a week. As
Building Supervisors, the RNs are in charge of the entire facility
and are the only persons on the premises charged with that
responsibility.3 26
319. See id. at 6-7.
320. See Brief for Respondent, Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. at 3, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty.
Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
321. Id. at 2.
322. See Motley, supra note 249, at 738-39.
323. Brief for Respondent, Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. at 2, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty.
Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 2-3.
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The duties and responsibilities of building supervisors as listed in the
"Procedure for Building Supervision" and a memorandum to all
nurses "clearly communicate[s] to all staff the fact that during the
times when other [s]ection 2(11) supervisors are not at the facility,
the RN Building Supervisor has overall responsibility at the facility,
and the staff are accountable and answerable to the Building Supervi-
sor."3 27 The purpose of the building supervisor designation was to
"centralize and coordinate building coverage, safety, and other activi-
ties." 328 "Building Supervisors' primary responsibility is that of senior
medical staff in the building at all times." 329
The employer concentrates on the power of building supervisors
to increase staffing levels, to call in additional staff, to arrange staffing
levels, as well as their express authority to write up an employee who
fails to comply with a decision to shift between units and their author-
ity to send employees home for misconduct.330 The building supervi-
sor exercises her independent judgment to determine if any of the
actions are warranted. Additionally, such authority extends over all
staff, including nursing staff, rehabilitation staff, and maintenance
staff, provided the building supervisor subsequently informs the em-
ployee's immediate supervisor. 331
The Board's interpretation of section 2(11) is centered on the
assertion that "an employee's exercise of professional or technical
judgment in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in ac-
cordance with employer-specified standards does not constitute the
exercise of 'independent judgment." 332 The employer contends that
this interpretation is: (1) irrational and inconsistent; (2) contravenes
the Congressional purpose of including "responsibly to direct" in the
definition of supervisor under the Act in 1947; (3) contravenes the
Congressional purpose behind the supervisor exclusion-Congress
excluded supervisors from the Act to restore the balance of power
between employers and union and to avoid conflicts of interest be-
tween management and rank and file employees; (4) eliminates pro-
fessionals as supervisors; (5) is part of a history of inconsistent rulings
in supervisor cases which amount to manipulation of the statute to
327. Id. at 3.
328. Id. "Building Supervisors visit the units to check the coverage and, if necessary,
determine in their judgment which employees to move from one unit to another." Id.
329. Id.
330. See Brief for Respondent, Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. at 4, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty.
Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
331. See id at 4-5.
332. Id. at 5.
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accomplish its biased policy objectives; (6) is a disguised attempt to
revive the patient care analysis and creates a false dichotomy between
professional judgment and independent judgment.33 3 Assuming the
soundness of these arguments, the Board cannot be entitled to defer-
ence in interpreting the term independent judgment. On the con-
trary, its interpretation is irrational and inconsistent with the Act.
In its defense, as explicated by its brief, the NLRB relies initially
on the text of the statute. It states that the
use of both the limiting phrase "not of a merely routine or clerical
nature" and the adjective "independent," suggests that in order to
be considered a supervisor, an employee must exercise judgment
beyond that involved in regular or customary activities and which is
not controlled or significantly constrained by outside sources.
334
If the Board's approach is correct, then
whenever an employee is promoted due to his or her superior
training, experience, or skills, he or she is not to be considered a
supervisor, but instead should still be considered a professional
employee whose work objective has merely been altered ....
[T]herefore, whatever direction takes place is merely done to ac-
complish his or her professional objectives. 335
Since more and more contemporary workers are skilled professionals
with extensive experience, the professional inclusion contained in sec-
tion 2 (12), if interpreted consistent with the NLRB's view will increas-
ingly trump the supervisory exclusion within the meaning of section
2(11). Since many contemporary workers are professionals, fewer of
them qualify as supervisors no matter how much direction and discre-
tion they exercise. In addition, the claim that all or perhaps most "as-
signment and direction necessarily involves independent
judgment"3 36 is dismissed by the Board as inconsistent with the reali-
ties of the contemporary workplace. The NLRB argues, in general,
that the
Board's view reflects Congress's intent to adopt the Board's prac-
tice under the Wagner Act of excluding from supervisory status em-
ployees who, in addition to doing their own work, provided limited
direction for others based on technical skills or employer-specified
standards .... [T] he Board's interpretation of "IndependentJudg-
ment" harmonizes Section 2(11)'s exclusion of supervisors with
333. See id. at 5-7.
334. Brief for Petitioner National Labor Relations Board at 12, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty.
Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
335. Motley, supra note 249, at 738.
336. Reply Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 7 n.5, NLRB v. Ky. River
Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
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Section 2(12)'s inclusion within the Act of "professional employ-
ees," who, by definition, exercise "discretion and judgment. 3 37
Since the RNs at issue fail to exercise "significant" discretion with re-
spect to supervisory powers, and since the discretion accompanying
the duties was so circumscribed by limitations as to negate the use of
independent judgment, they are apparently not supervisors. 338 At its
core, the NLRB's approach is similar to the majority view taken in
Packard mandating that NLRA coverage protections be broadly
construed.
One argument in favor of the Board's approach is that given the
level of increased technical skill and professional expertise possessed
by average contemporary workers, the deployment of such skill and
expertise as the position requires can be presumed to be routine and
customary. If this technique remains defensible, then professional
skill and judgment would justifiably be seen as merely routine, thus
disallowing the application of the supervisory exclusion. But, by rely-
ing "on broad 'guiding principles"' and "[b]y assuming that exercis-
ing professional judgment is always routine, the Board ignores the
well-recognized principle that the analysis of whether an individual is
a supervisor is fact-specific." 339 The Board's approach "leaves very little
room for meaningful factual analysis and leaves few activities that
would be deemed supervisory under its analysis. '3 40 Strangely, as Sena-
tor Flanders explained in 1947, one fact is of particular interest-the
"basic act of supervising. ' 341 The addition of the phrase "to respon-
sibly direct" was placed within the language excluding supervisors
because
under some modern management methods, the supervisor might
be deprived of authority for most of the functions enumerated and
337. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 12, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care,
Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
338. See id. at 16-20.
339. Brief for Respondent, Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. at 11, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty.
Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
340. Motley, supra note 249, at 738. Evidently one such guiding "principle is that work-
ers whose direction of other employees reflects the director's 'superior training, experi-
ence, or skills' should not be deemed supervisors but instead professional utilizing
professional discretion." Id. (citing Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. 717, 729 (1996)).
341. 93 CONG. REc. S1126, 4677-78 (daily ed. May 7, 1947) (statement of Sen. Flan-
ders). This language was accepted by Senator Taft and added to the definition of "supervi-
sor." Id. at 4678 (cited in Brief for Respondent, Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. at 14, NLRB v. Ky.
River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001)). See Reply Brief for National
Labor Relations Board at 8-9, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May
29, 2001).
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still have a large responsibility for the exercise of personal judg-
ment based on personal experience, training, and ability.
Such men [and women] are above the grade of "straw bosses, lead
men, set-up men, and other minor supervisory employees" as enu-
merated in the report. Their essential managerial duties are best
defined by the words "direct responsibly .... 342
This is in reliance on the exercise of personal judgment based on per-
sonal experience, training, and ability. 343 If this riposte is defensi-
ble, 344 it turns out to be highly likely that the six RNs are supervisors.
On the other hand, the Board assumes "the position that this case
is limited solely to the interpretation of 'independent judgment' and
disavows any argument that the term 'responsibly to direct' is impli-
cated in the analysis." 34 5 At the same time it concedes that the "Board
also has elected not to develop a full analysis of the term 'responsibly
to direct' in the abstract. '3 46 Despite the fact that registered nurses
engage in some supervisory activities such as ensuring coverage, per-
forming as building supervisors, exercising authority as the only super-
visor present, and directing the forty rehabilitation assistants on how
to deal with unusual situations that arise when counselors are not pre-
sent, the Board evidently believes that "whatever direction takes place
is merely done to accomplish [their] professional objectives." 347 This
is because the RNs' activities are partially grounded in professional
expertise and professional experience, skills, and training on the one
hand; or on the other hand, they only possess "minor supervisory re-
342. 93 CONG. REC. S1126, 4677-78 (daily ed. May 7, 1947) (statement of Sen. Flan-
ders) (cited in Brief For Respondent, Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. at 14, No. 99-1815 (U.S.
May 29, 2001)).
343. See id.
344. In actuality, the employer provided a number of arguments in support of its con-
clusion that the Board's order remains unenforceable because the Board's interpretation
of "independent judgment" is irrational, arbitrary, and inconsistent with the Act. The em-
ployer argues that (1) the Board's interpretation is a disguised attempt to revive the patient
care analysis and creates a false dichotomy between professional judgment and indepen-
dent judgment; (2) the Board's interpretation frustrates the legislative intent behind both
the phrase "responsibly to direct" and the Act's exclusion of supervisors; (3) the Board's
interpretation will eliminate professionals as supervisors; (4) deference to the Board is not
required because the Board has engaged in blatant manipulation of the statute to further
policy rather than following the text and intent of the statute. See Brief for Respondent, Ky.
River Cmty. Care, Inc. at 1-14, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May
29, 2001).
345. Reply Brief for National Labor Relations Board at 8 n.6, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty.
Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
346. Id. at 8.
347. Motley, supra note 249, at 738.
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sponsibilities . .. [and] do not exercise true managerial power. 3 4 8
Consequently, the NLRB classifies the six RNs as professionals who
must be included within NLRA coverage.
B. The Decision and Holding
In deciding that the Board's interpretation "goes beyond the lim-
its of what is ambiguous and contradicts what in our view is quite
clear, ' 349 the Supreme Court disagrees fundamentally with the
Board's determination that employee judgment cannot be indepen-
dent if it is significant yet professional or technical in nature, or based
on greater experience or formal training and only'loosely constrained
by the employer.3 50 The Court rather easily dismisses the NLRB's
claim by demonstrating that virtually any supervisory judgment worth
exercising must rest on professional or technical skill or experi-
ence.3 51 Acceptance of the Board's policy would largely eviscerate the
supervisory exclusion unless limited. The Board offers this limitation:
"Only professional judgment that is applied 'in directing less-skilled
employees to deliver services' is excluded from the statutory category
of 'independent judgment.' "352 This restriction is equally problematic
and
is directly contrary to the text of the statute. Every supervisory func-
tion listed by the Act is accompanied by the statutory requirement
that its exercise "require the use of independent judgment" before
supervisory status will obtain, but the Board would apply its restric-
tion upon "independent judgment" to just 1 of the 12 listed func-
tions: "responsibly to direct." There is no apparent textual
justification for this asymmetrical limitation, and the Board has of-
fered none.353
If the Board wished to be consistent, then concededly, managerial and
supervisory functions such as termination, demotion, and suspension,
which often depend on professional judgment and expertise, could
not result in exclusion from the Act, since the judgment exercised
could not be "independent" because it was professional. 354 As in prior
cases, the Board ultimately rests its defense of its interpretation of "in-
dependent judgment" on policy concerns surrounding its intent to
348. Brief for Petitioner National Labor Relations Board at 24, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty.
Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
349. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815, slip op. at 7 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
350. See id; see also Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3.
351. See Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815, slip op. at 7 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
352. Id.
353. See id.
354. See id.
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maximize NLRA coverage for professionals 355 while expressing no pol-
icy concern for the Taft-Hartley Act's animating purpose to eliminate
supervisors from NLRA coverage. This turns the notion of supervision
on its head. The Board's technique categorically excludes "profes-
sional judgment" from the term "independent judgment" and radi-
cally contradicts the text of the statute. 356 While it is possible to argue
that the term "independent judgment" is indisputably ambiguous, 357
and while it is possible to argue that the scope of nursing practice
routinely involves the exercise of judgment and the supervision of
others, 358 the logic of those contentions fails to vitiate the view that
the exercise of independent judgment in responsibly directing less-
skilled subordinates constitutes the application of management pre-
rogatives. Since the statute unambiguously excludes employees who
exercise "independent judgment" pursuant to a "sufficient degree of
discretion, "359 and since there is no statutory ambiguity in the fact that
exercising a sufficient degree of discretion in "responsibly directing"
others constitutes statutorily protected and excluded activity, the RNs
are supervisors.
IV. Kentucky River in the Mirror of Packard
We shall cease not from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time. 360
The dissent in Packard presents factors that significantly enrich
our understanding of Kentucky River. These factors include concern
for evaluating the outmoded notion of class conflict which has led
some observers to seek an expansive conception of NLRA coverage;
the divergence in interests between mid-ranked employees and those
at the lower ranks, given the objective of allowing rank and file work-
ers to organize free of supervisory interference; the increased likeli-
hood of divided loyalties in the mirror of the gradual movement of
workers up the ranks of the hierarchy as more and more contempo-
rary workers possess professional and technical skills coupled with
355. See id. at 8.
356. See id. at 9.
357. See Ky. River Cmty. Care, No. 99-1815, Stevens, J., dissenting at 3 (U.S. May 29,
2001).
358. See Brief of Amici Curiae, American Nursing Ass'n at 2-6, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty.
Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001). *
359. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815, slip op. at 7 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
360. T.S. Elliot, Little Gidding (1942).
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training and experience; and the possibility that Packard's discussion
supplies a vehicle for lacerating and reordering the ongoing textual-
ism versus legislative history debate.
Before reconsidering Kentucky River as informed by these four fac-
tors, it is important to note that the NLRB has argued,
Congress essentially adopted the definition of supervisor that the
Board had employed in administering the original NLRA, known
as the Wagner Act. Under that definition, as under its current prac-
tice, the Board did not class as supervisors employees who, in addi-
tion to doing their own work, provided limited direction for others
based on technical skills or employer-specified standards. 361
This claim apparently ignores the logical force of the amendments
defining supervision under the Taft-Hartley Act, as well as the Board's
vacillation under the Wagner Act as originally enacted. Taft-Hartley
fails to limit the term "supervision" simply, as the Board contends, to
those "who supervise or direct the work of employees [in the bargain-
ing unit], and who have authority to hire, promote, discharge, disci-
pline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of such employees, or
whose official recommendations concerning such action are accorded
effective weight."362 The statute defines Supervisor more broadly as:
Any individual having authority in the interest of the employer, to
hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend
such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature but re-
quires the use of independent judgment.363
Thus, unless any of twelve listed tasks implicated in the exercise
of authority fail to require independent judgment and are therefore
merely routine or clerical, such authority constitutes grounds for ex-
clusion from NLRA coverage and protection.
A. Radical Class Conflict and the Demand for an Expansive
Conception of NLRA Coverage
As discussed earlier, a number of commentators, animated by a
radical, class oriented, capital versus labor perspective have expressed
a longing to extend legal coverage and protection to concededly su-
pervisory or managerial employees and hence to expand the social
role of unions by enlarging the definition of the class for whom it is
361. Brief for Petitioner National Labor Relations Board at 24, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty.
Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
362. Id. at 25.
363. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (11) (1994).
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permissible for them to speak. This outlook apparently dismisses as
irrelevant management's concern for divided loyalty and manage-
ment's desire to minimize the number of workers who possess discre-
tionary authority that are covered by the NLRA. This approach
apparently attempts to accelerate the implementation of "workplace
democracy" as part of an initiative to diminish the power and financial
returns that accrue to capital. This far reaching capital versus labor
view finds expression in Justice Jackson's opinion in Packard. He sug-
gested that the NLRA's statutory purpose derived from the text is
found in a relatively broad definition of employees and a narrow defi-
nition of employers. The statute, in his view, embraces an uncon-
strained view of who is eligible for coverage by the Wagner Act. While
this approach effectively separates all or most employees from capital
but not from management, as Justice Douglas plainly demonstrates,
Congress was animated by the desire to protect the interest of laborers
and low-ranked workers by "defining who is to be considered an em-
ployer and who is to be deemed an employee,"364 as opposed to the
provision of legal protection for a nascent conflict between capital
and labor. He confirms the legislative history that is replete with refer-
ences to laborers as opposed to foremen and others within the mid-
dle-rank of the hierarchy.365
On the contrary, the NLRB believes that the purposes of the Act,
despite the additional constraints imposed by the Taft-Hartley Act, are
best vindicated by an expansive conception of the NLRA's coverage
and application. This is not necessarily a recent development.
In language which presaged contemporary circuit court decisions,
the House report [on the Taft-Hartley Act] found in 1947 that the
NLRB tended to expand its interpretation of the Act to maximize
coverage of the statute. The report noted that Congress intended
that the Act should always have been construed to exclude "super-
visors," but that "the Labor Board in the exercise of what it mod-
estly calls its 'expertness,' changed the law .... ,366 [and expanded
its constituency].
If these various contentions are true, they imply that the Board may
have been infected with a degree of class consciousness that, however
laudable, is inconsistent with the statutory text and intent. The Board
in fact asserts its conviction in its Kentucky River brief by declaring:
364. Keller, supra note 54, at 580 (citing Justice Douglas's dissent in Packard).
365. See Packard, 330 U.S. 498.
366. Brief of Amici Curiae, Am. Health Care Ass'n at 15, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care,
Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001) (in support of Respondent citing H. REP. No. 245
(1974), reprinted in Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Legislative History of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 308 (Comm. Print 1974)).
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Congress's intent to cover nurses and other professionals would be
frustrated, however, if the "consistent exercise of discretion and
judgment" under Section 2(12) also constitutes "the use of inde-
pendent judgment" under Section 2(11), because many profes-
sional employees (such as lawyers, doctors, and nurses) customarily
give judgment-based direction to the less-skilled employees with
whom they work. 367
Thus "a professional does not exercise 'independent judgment' to the
extent that her judgment is 'indistinguishable from the professional
judgment exercised by all [professionals in the same field].'"368 Since
an increasing percentage of workers can be classified as professionals
who exercise discretion and judgment, an increasing percentage of
workers cannot be classified as supervisors within the meaning of the
NLRA because, however many lesser-skilled individuals they direct,
however much authority they possess (including participation in the
discipline process), however independent their judgment may be,
however discretionary it is, it is indistinguishable from judgment simi-
larly exercised by professionals in the same industry. In effect, inclu-
sion of section 2(12) therefore voids the exclusion of section 2(11) by
defining professionals as employees who are either incapable of super-
vision or merely minor supervisors. This constrained conception of
both independent judgment and management prerogatives drives us
closer to the claim that the pertinent divide can be found in the
chasm between capital and labor, not management and labor.
In fact, the Taft-Hartley Amendments, while safeguarding the in-
terests of professionals, were clearly designed to protect the interest of
employers in retaining the undivided loyalties of supervisors, which,
among other things, led some to classify this Act as a "slave labor" law.
Therefore, it is possible to argue, "that 'supervisory status' is not an
exemption from the Act, but an additional protected classification
under the Act."3 69 Protection accrues not to employees but to employ-
ers. Admittedly, neither the NLRB nor the courts have been inclined
to explicitly and fully embrace the largely outmoded and far reaching
capital versus labor view that Justice Douglas rightly rejected. Instead,
Justice Stevens's dissent forcefully contends that the "definition of 'su-
pervisor' was intended to apply only to those employees with 'genuine
367. Brief of the National Labor Relations Board at 33, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care,
Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
368. Id.
369. Brief ofAmici Curiae, Am. Health Care Ass'n at 16, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care,
Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
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management prerogatives"' 370 without understanding that the con-
temporary workplace often places genuine management prerogatives
in the hands of skilled, hands-on employees, called professionals pre-
cisely because they can handle both responsibilities. Significantly, the
ongoing "decentralization of workplaces and the resulting expansion
of worker participation in the management and control of the work-
place"37 1 likely mean most genuine management functions are placed
in the hands of individuals whose work cannot be solely cabined
within Justice Stevens's proposed limits. Nurses, for instance, "increas-
ingly perform critical supervisory functions related to the provision of
patient care that require independent judgment, 3 72 something nurs-
ing associations admit.3 73 The "increasing demand for nursing ser-
vices, [the] decreasing numbers of nurses, and mounting economic
pressures require employers to depend upon nurses' supervisory pow-
ers."374 While an expansive conception of the class of workers to
which the NLRA applies may appeal to commentators taken by a radi-
cal capital versus labor analysis, it is doubtful that such a conception
comports with either the statutory language or its purpose.
B. Possible Divergence in Interest Between Mid-Ranked and
Lower-Ranked Employees
In Packard, the foremen as a group were highly-paid, and unlike
the workmen they supervised, received longer paid vacations and were
given severance upon termination by the company. 375 Foremen were
responsible for maintaining quantity and quality of production. 376
Given that they were situated in a separate bargaining unit, the possi-
bility that any divergence in interest between foremen and workmen
would adversely affect the concerted activity of the rank and file was
limited. Still, it must be acknowledged that interests that are adverse
to the interest of the rank and file'might govern foremen. If the basic
opposing forces in industry are management and labor as Justice
Douglas asserts, then the inclusion of individuals who possess manage-
370. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815, Stevens, J., dissenting at 6 n.8 (U.S. May 29,
2001).
371. Keller, supra note 54, at 620-21.
372. Brief of Amici Curiae, Soc'y of Human Res. Mgmt. and Am. Soc'y for Healthcare
Human Res. Admin. at 5, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29,
2001).
373. See id. at 5-7.
374. Id. at 8.
375. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 487 (1947).
376. See id.
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ment prerogatives within the same bargaining unit may be problem-
atic. That is especially true if we conclude that "individuals make
material sacrifices for group welfare .... Groups achieve solidarity
and elicit loyalty beyond what economic analysis conventionally
predicts . . .377
One observer, assessing an early NLRB decision3 7 denying NLRA
protection to foremen, characterized the potential problems in ex-
tending the protections of the NLRA as follows: unionization of indi-
viduals with management responsibilities gives rise to the
danger that a managerial union could be destructive of the statu-
tory rights of the rank and file .. . when, it was composed of em-
ployees whose interests most diverged from those of the rank and
file as measured by the usual Board criteria, such as rates of pay
and similarity of work.379
This fear, justified or not,380 cannot be limited to disquiet for the in-
terest of rank and file workers within the industrial and blue collar
sectors. Allowing health care workers, technical workers, and others
who participate in the formulation, implementation, or enforcement
of policies, even where their participation is driven largely by profes-
sional criteria, to unionize may risk the destruction of the statutory
rights of the rank and file. New life is breathed into this fear by per-
ceiving that professionals for example, "retain sufficient technical au-
tonomy to preserve a qualitatively better position than most other
[lower ranked] workers."381
American and global developments, which alter the composition
of the workforce and which restructure the workplace, likely augment
interest divergence between those located at the middle ranks of the
hierarchy38 2 (such as charge nurses and RNs) and those located at the
377. Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Produc-
tion and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1003, 1007 (1995). As McAdams, percep-
tively argues: "Groups use intra-group status rewards as a non-material means of gaining
material sacrifice from members, but the attendant desire for inter-group status causes
inter-group conflict." Id.
378. See Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943).
379. Feldman, Workplace Power, supra note 43, at 549-50.
380. See Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers, supra note 44, at 1780-81 (the as-
sumption that unionization of managerial and supervisory employees presents an intolera-
ble threat of divided loyalties has never been justified theoretically).
381. Id. at 1835-36.
382. An illustration of nursing hierarchy in a hospital setting is in order.
Within hospitals, a hierarchy exists among nursing personnel ranging from nurs-
ing administrators to nursing supervisors, charge nurses, and staff nurses. In the
hospital setting, unions and employers most often dispute the supervisory status
of those nurses who serve at least a portion of their time as a charge nurse. The
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bottom rank (such as nurses aides or rehabilitation assistants). This
state of affairs gives rise to the possibility (within a unionized setting)
that the interests of middle-rank employees will trump the interest of
less skilled workers. While this Article concedes that possible varia-
tions in interest are not necessarily always problematic, -8 3 especially in
situations where a separate union represents those located within the
middle ranks, this Article contends that the placement of mid-ranked
employees in the same bargaining unit with lower-ranked workers,
constitutes a tangible threat to the interest of lesser-skilled, lower-
ranked workers. This Article offers the intuitive, yet not fully proven,
observation that workplace alterations intensify interest divergence.
This conclusion, inspired by the background and history associated
with the enactment of the Wagner Act, the background associated
with the Taft-Hartley Act, as well as the dissent in Packard, provides a
basis for skepticism about attempts to extend coverage to contempo-
rary workers who exercise 'judgment" premised on professional or
technical expertise which may extend beyond the parameters of dis-
cretion exercised by foremen in the 1940s.
The Packard majority rejected the above-referenced concerns
grounded, as they were, in industrial policy and in the animating pur-
pose of the statute. Instead, underpinned by its concern for textual
purity, it found the provisions of the statute plain and therefore not
subject to dispute.3 8 4 Intended or not, this conception of the NLRA
evidently "ignores or downplays conflicts among employees them-
selves." 385 Justice Douglas, on the other hand, luminously sustained
the notion that the statute as conceived through its legislative history
and stated purpose was largely intended to protect and cover working
men and women as opposed to mid-ranked workers. While relatively
unskilled laborers occupy a shrinking percentage of today's work
force, we should not lose sight of the conclusion that it was their wel-
fare and not the welfare of directors of lesser-skilled employees that was
the prime object behind the passage of the Wagner Act. In light of not
only the rejection of an expansive conception of the NLRA by Con-
charge nurse's duty consists primarily of "coordinating" patient care within the
assigned area of his or her department.
Motley, supra note 249, at 715.
383. Indeed, Justice Douglas indicates that some labor leaders thought, "if those in the
hierarchy above the workers are unionized, they will be more sympathetic with the claims
of those below them." Packard Motor Car. Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 495 (1947) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting).
384. See id. at 493.
385. Crain & Matheny, supra note 125, at 1543.
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gress in 1947 and the incontrovertible evidence which shows that Con-
gress intended to further constrain the NLRA through its passage of
the LMRA, it is possible to contend that the Taft-Hartley Amend-
ments, including the statutory definition of supervisors in general and
the concept of independent judgment in particular, imply that Con-
gress meant to limit, not expand, the already limited coverage of the
NLRA. This assessment not only affects the contemporary meaning of
"independent judgment," it leads to the conclusion that independent
judgment, however difficult to define, should be interpreted to nar-
row rather than expand the Act's coverage. While the NLRB disagrees
with this claim,386 the debate over the statutory amendment's applica-
tion to the six RNs who acted as building supervisors as well as hands-
on nurses in the Kentucky River case can be further illuminated.
The Caney Creek facility provides an excellent illustration of the
evolution of work and the workplace in the United States. While the
six RNs are clearly professionals who supply medical services to re-
sidents, and while the RNs participate in the formulation of the medi-
cal component that comprises part of the rehabilitation plan, the RNs
also direct less-skilled employees. Lesser-skilled workers who are sub-
ject to RN direction on a fairly consistent basis include LPNs. They are
supervised and must comply with directions of the RNs with respect to
administering medication and ensuring proper documentation. That
conclusion is consistent with statements made by nursing associations,
and in the case of home based health care, directives issued pursuant
to federal Medicare regulations and the typical conduct of nursing
homes.3 87 Furthermore, the RNs direct forty rehabilitation assistants
on how to deal with unusual situations that arise when the rehabilita-
tion counselors are not present. The RNs also act as building supervi-
sors during seventy-five percent of the total hours in a week pursuant
to the management goal of centralizing building coverage, safety and
other activities. In other words, they responsibly direct others. Accord-
ing to this analysis, grounded on an expansion in the participation of
RNs in the management and control of the workplace, it is likely that
the interests of RNs differ fundamentally from the interests of lesser
skilled LPNs, rehabilitation assistants and others who are not empow-
386. See Brief for National Labor Relations Board at 23-24, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty.
Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001) (arguing that the Board's interpretation is
both consistent with and furthers the purpose of the supervisory exclusion while concur-
rently accommodating the Act's coverage of professional employees).
387. See Brief of Amici Curiae, Soc'y of Human Res. Mgmt. and Am. Soc'y for Health-
care Human Res. Admin. at 5, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May
29, 2001).
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ered, to move employees from one unit to another and must submit
to the RNs authority on a consistent basis. If the central objective of
the NLRA was to ensure that the interest of the most vulnerable work-
ing women and men are protected through coverage by the NLRA, it
is doubtful that this goal progresses by the placement of highly skilled
and professionally trained RNs who exercise judgment in the interest
of the employer in the same bargaining unit with lesser-skilled individ-
uals. Potential conflict between those who direct and those who are
members of the lesser-skilled cohort imply that Kentucky River's six RNs
should be separated from their lesser-skilled colleagues.
C. Divided Loyalties in the Mirror of the Movement of Workers
Up the Ranks of Hierarchy
Employer dread about actual or potential divided loyalties often
echoes through discussions of why supervisors ought to be excluded
from NLRA coverage. Such apprehension, as implicated by the in-
creasingly decentralized workplaces and the rising percentage of mid-
ranking employees within the hierarchy helpfully hints at a principled
way to approach the six RNs at issue in Kentucky River. The NLRB ad-
mits, or at a minimum virtually concedes, that the RNs engage in su-
pervisory activity in "occasionally" directing lesser-skilled subordinates.
More generally, many Board members and some judges evidently
favor a definition of "employee" that includes supervisors. They assert
the possibility that unionized supervisors might refrain from duties
that might alienate their subordinates is not only empirically un-
founded, but is also "repugnant to the basic democratic philosophy of
the NLRA."38 8
However repugnant, as Yeshiva University illustrates, 389 claims and
counterclaims of actual or potential divided loyalty echo throughout
disputes over whether supervisors ought to be excluded and who
ought to be considered a supervisor. Indeed, in its Kentucky River brief,
the Board explained that "the exclusion of supervisors from NLRA
coverage was designed to ensure that management could rely on the
undivided loyalty of its representatives, but Congress intended to pre-
serve the Act's protections for those employees... who do not exer-
388. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers, supra note 44, at 1786.
389. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 682 (1980) (acknowledging that the Act's
exclusion of supervisors grows out the concern that employers are entitled to the undi-
vided loyalty of its representatives).
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cise true managerial power."390 The right to exclude, a protected right
that inheres with the employer,391ensures that management is not re-
quired to negotiate with itself about policy matters. Since more and
more contemporary workers are engaged in discretionary policy im-
plementation presumably in the interests of the employer, it is crucial
to note that in at least one case, the Supreme Court denied a union
demand which would require mandatory negotiations about policy is-
sues because to do so would make the union "an equal partner."392
While this view has not gone unchallenged,3 93 the Supreme Court's
conclusion about the correct limits to be placed on collective labor
power has beneficial implications for the loyalty demands employers
place on workers located within the middle of the hierarchy. This is
because the "view that issues of fundamental policy are managerial
prerogatives underlies the distinction that derives from assumptions
about the limited role of industrial employees." 394
Apparently many commentators have difficulty conceiving super-
vision outside of the context of industrial foremen. They necessarily
assume that professionals in a decentralized workplace who both par-
ticipate in hands-on work as well as in the management and control of
the workplace, cannot be supervisors because they fail to look like
foremen. For instance, "[p]rofessional employees, particularly those
who do not work in industrial settings, have more autonomy from hi-
erarchical control and more involvement in organizational decision-
making than the workers for whom the statute was initially
intended."395 This clarifying determination grounded in contempo-
rary workplace alterations, justifies and fortifies an employer's fear of
divided loyalties, despite sociological claims to the contrary.39 6 If
390. Brief for National Labor Relations Board at 24, NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care,
Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001). This claim is cabined by the NLRB's assertion that
"Congress intended to preserve the Act's protections for those employees with minor su-
pervisory responsibilities who do not exercise true managerial power." Id.
391. This conception of section 2(11) as an employer right is grounded in the legisla-
tive history of the Taft-Hartley Act. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 245, at 8 (1974) (stating that the
evidence further shows that management must have agents who are entirely loyal, just as
representatives of the workers must be undivided in their loyalty to the workers).
392. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981).
393. See, e.g., Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining, supra
note 16, at 712.
394. Id.
395. See Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers, supra note 44, at 1778.
396. See id. at 1831-36. Professor Rabban provides a rich background of sociological
scholarship that posits a distinction between managerial professionals and practicing pro-
fessions. Managerial professionals allegedly have positions of bureaucratic power within an
organization's formal hierarchy while practicing professionals have .positions of bureau-
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union members were engaged in a slowdown of work, the charge
nurse who engages in both hands-on work and the direction of lesser-
skilled employees would likely be required to report such activity,
which could result in discipline. If the charge nurse were a fellow
union member, she would likely feel pressure not to report the ac-
tion.3 9 7 Thus, the charge nurses may be exposed to divided loyalty that
might compromise the employer's need for swift discipline that is un-
impeded by other considerations.
Similarly, let us assume that the determination of whether the six
RNs in Kentucky River are supervisors remains an ambiguous proposi-
tion. In this case, unionized building supervisors who, in addition to
hands-on activity, direct LPNs with respect to the administration of
medication and documentation, direct forty rehabilitation assistants
when rehabilitation counselors are not present, and are often in
charge of the entire facility, would likely feel group pressures not to
fully report collective bargaining related conduct or misconduct en-
gaged by fellow union members. While the NLRB stresses that a stipu-
lated supervisor is always on call during the times that RNs act as
building supervisors, potential, if not actual, divided loyalty may plau-
sibly induce RNs who are active members of the union to decline to
make the call to a supervisor in an effort to avoid adverse work impli-
cations for fellow union members. As Justice Douglas illuminated
earlier:
If foremen were to be included as employees under the Act, special
problems would be raised-important problems relating to the
unit in which the foremen might be represented. Foremen are also
under the Act as employers [or as representatives of employers].
That dual status creates serious problems. An act of a foremen, if
attributed to the management, constitutes an unfair labor practice;
the same act may be part of the foreman's activity as an
employee .39
Likewise, RNs as building supervisors, and as part of their exercise of
discretion, direct lesser skilled workers. RNs also direct LPNs in resi-
dent care. If RNs are included as covered employees within the bar-
cratic power. See id. at 1833-35. Whether these claims, if true, have any relevance or should
have any relevance to either the text of the NLRA as amended, employer fears of divided
loyalty and judicial decisions about the scope of the supervisory exclusion, depends of
course on the statute itself.
397. See Motley, supra note 249, at 738. The author suggests that the issue of divided
loyalty may differ depending on whether the situation arises in a nursing home or in a
hospital. See id. at 736.
398. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 497 (1947) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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gaining unit under the protection of the NLRA, special problems may
arise. For instance, since they act as building supervisors, it is plausible
that such activity, which could be justifiably attributed to their em-
ployer, constitutes an unfair labor practice. Since they are also mem-
bers of the union, their misconduct can result in an unfair labor
practice charge, which benefits them as a member of the bargaining
unit. It is doubtful that such a result can be squared with the either
the text or the purpose of the statute.
Examining some of the specific factors which Justice Douglas pro-
posed for determining who ought to be excluded 399 from the statute's
coverage, confirms that doubt. First, an inspection of the industry's
operations and the disputed employee's place in the company and the
industry's hierarchy finds that few individuals are more important that
RNs, especially in circumstances where they act as building supervisors
with responsibility for the entire facility during two-thirds of its opera-
tional time. In addition, they consistently direct lesser-skilled workers
in administering and documenting the medical component of resi-
dent care. Second RNs have the capacity to participate in the imple-
mentation of the employer's labor policies. They direct the LPNs,
ensure resident care, and often direct the entire facility and accord-
ingly they are often the only people who have the capacity to imple-
ment management's labor policy. Third, given their place within the
hierarchy, and given their responsibility to responsibly direct, includ-
ing RNs within the bargaining unit would tend to blur the line be-
tween management and labor. Taken as a whole, these factors warrant
a high degree of skepticism when and if the Board insists on placing
RNs within the bargaining unit.
Comparatively speaking, like typical professionals who engage in
the direction of lesser-skilled individuals, Kentucky River's six RNs, de-
spite participation in hands-on activity concerning resident care, have
more responsibility and exercise more judgment than the foremen in
Packard had more than fifty years ago. The foremen in Packard carried
the responsibility of maintaining quantity and quality of production
subject to the overall control and supervision of management. While
the foremen neither hired nor discharged workers, they were pro-
vided with forms and with a detail of penalties to be applied in cases of
violations of discipline. They also made recommendations for promo-
tion, demotion, and discipline. 400 In Kentucky River, acting as building
supervisors, the RNs have authority, even if unexercised, to "write up
399. See id. at 496-97 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
400. Id. at 487.
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an employee who does not comply with a decision to shift that em-
ployee between units. '40 1 "They also have authority to send an em-
ployee home whenever that employee engages in misconduct" 40 2 and
they also have the right to reassign workers.403 In addition, as part of
their non-building supervisory role, RN's direct LPNs with respect to
the administration of medicine and proper documentation. The RNs
accordingly ensure the quality of resident patient care. Unlike the
foremen in Packard, all of these indicia of authority "extend[ ] over
the entire staff (except stipulated supervisors), including nursing staff,
rehabilitation staff, and maintenance staff provided that the RN subse-
quently informs the employee's immediate supervisor."404 RNs acting
as building supervisors participate in the process of discipline through
the write up process and engage in actual discipline by virtue of their
authority to send someone home, and this authority extends to all
employees at the facility. Taken together, indicia of supervision give
rise to justifiable employer apprehension concerning the loyalty of
RNs.
The NLRB, on the other hand, argues that the duties of Regis-
tered Nurses are less than comparable to those of foremen largely be-
cause, unlike foremen, RNs "perform hands-on medical treatment
and give limited direction to other members of their teams, based on
their experience and special competence pursuant to the require-
ments of the residents' treatment plans. '40 5 The approach of the
Board effectively means that workers who gain special competence
and experience even if they participate in the development of resi-
dent treatment plans and effectuate policies and conduct to imple-
ment them, are deprived of supervisory status because they, unlike
industrial foremen, actually participate in the work (the medical treat-
ment of residents) of the unit. RNs, unlike foremen, are often the
only individuals who can personify management prerogatives. The
Board evidently has little concern for the employer's right to the undi-
vided loyalty of such employees.
To be sure, "employees whose decisionmaking is limited to the
routine discharge of professional duties in projects to which they have
been assigned cannot be excluded from coverage even if union mem-
401. Brief for Respondent Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. at 4, NLRB v. Ky. River Crnty.
Care, Inc., No. 99-8815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
402. Id.
403. See id.
404. Id. at 5.
405. Reply Brief for National Labor Relations Board at 9-10, NLRB v. Ky. River Crnty.
Care, Inc., No. 99-1815 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
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bership arguably may involve some divided loyalty. '406 Nonetheless, a
careful reading of the facts and an understanding of the concept of
divided loyalty, employer trepidation in general, particularly with re-
spect to the RNs in Kentucky River, has been justifiably confirmed. It is
true that many conflicting40 7 claims about divided loyalties surface
when contemporary individuals with professional, technical and/or
supervisory responsibilities, who perform tasks requiring some degree
of discretion and judgment (professional or not), claim to be pro-
tected by the NLRA. However, the pertinent question becomes: Can
tasks, which require independent judgment in the sense that section
2(11) requires in order to exclude supervisors as employers demand,
be separated from judgment located in professional standards as
stated in section 2(12)? If not, in which direction should the Board
and the courts tilt? This dispute is grounded in the "degree of em-
ployee power in the workplace, that can be accepted withoutjeopard-
izing employer control" 408 as well as the degree to which provision of
the statute should be given priority other the other. Those commenta-
tors who remain unhappy with the current level of employer control
and the absence of both employee power and workplace democracy
may search for ways to change the parameters of control and hence
the terms of debate by redefining, or attempting to redefine, the stat-
ute itself. On the other hand, if Justice Douglas's dissent proves cor-
rect, the policy, purpose, and legislative history of the original Act
foreshadow the text and purpose of the amended Act. Taken to-
gether, these factors imply that the statute remains a conservative, as
opposed to expansive, device which expresses a concern for divided
loyalties of those who act on behalf of management. This concern fun-
damentally underpins the conclusion that the six RNs should be classi-
fied as supervisors and therefore excluded from NLRA coverage.
406. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 690 (1980).
407. See, e.g., Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers, supra note 44, at 1786 (arguing
that
[b]oard members and judges who favored a definition of "employee" that in-
cluded supervisors dismissed the concern about divided loyalties. They viewed the
image of unionized supervisors refraining from duties that might alienate their
subordinates not simply as empirically unfounded, but also as "repugnant to the
basic democratic philosophy of the NLRA.").
408. Feldman, Workplace Power, supra note 43, at 526. The Supreme Court, thus far has
refused Board-sponsored invitations to expand the groups of "employees" who are pro-
tected by the LMRA. Thus supervisors and managerial employees as defined are outside of
the scope of the Wagner Act's protective umbrella and, accordingly, one can argue that the
employer's domain of control remains fairly broad. See, e.g., id. at 527-28.
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D. Reordering the Textualism Debate
Technique exists because it is Technique. 40 9
It is surely possible that decisions like Kentucky River, and Health
Care before it, "present a clear and growing threat to all federal ad-
ministrative agencies. '4 10 Indeed, it might be possible that textualism,
"[i]n its extreme form... threatens to violate the separation of pow-
ers doctrine. '4 11 But these doubtful claims are rarely aimed at the
Packard decision that stands as the quintessential example of textual-
ism in the labor law arena. Yet, in the wake of Health Care, we are told,
" [p] rompt action is needed to stop the spread of this destructive form
of statutory interpretation '41 2 which if unchecked will "exact great fi-
nancial, economic, and social costs, wreaking havoc in an already less-
than-efficient federal administrative system. '4 13 Judge Patricia Wald
has entered the dispute with this claim: "The issue of whether and
how to use legislative history in determining the meaning of statutes
ought to be a pressing concern to all of us who care about how laws
are made and interpreted; it implicates the respective roles of legisla-
tors and judges in our constitutional system." 414 Reportedly, the entire
doctrine of judicial deference to administrative agencies is menaced
by textualism. 4 15 Resolving these claims exceeds the scope of this en-
terprise. These claims may simply reflect, and are likely congruent
with a predisposition to favor expansive interpretations of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, if not bureaucratic, and administrative
power.
While references to legislative history and statutory purpose on
the one hand, and textualism 416 on the other, may not always provide
a sound basis for interpreting statutes, they are unavoidable. Thus, the
Packard majority found the intent of Congress in the literal text of the
Act. As Hilary Jewett elegantly summarizes:
In Packard, the NLRB found, and the Supreme Court affirmed, that
foremen on an assembly line at a Packard auto plant could be con-
409. ELLUL, supra note 2, at 436.
410. Keller, supra note 54, at 576.
411. Id. at 576-77.
412. Id. at 577.
413. Id.
414. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Stat-
utes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 Am. U. L. REv. 277, 279 (1990).
415. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.
L. Q. 351, 354 (1994).
416. See Keller, supra note 54, at 619-20 (analyzing the debate between the Board and
the Supreme Court and concluding that Board distinctions are both inherently unwork-
able and indefensible in light of opposition from textualist-minded courts).
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sidered employees under the NLRA because the Act contained no
explicit exclusion for supervisory employees. In the five-to-four de-
cision, the majority interpreted the statute literally, finding no lan-
guage specifically excluding employees such as foremen, and "no
ambiguity" in the wording of the statute which would require a "re-
sort to legislative history."417
The dissent, however, relies on both the statutory text, coupled with
its understanding of both the legislative history and statutory purpose
to deny the conclusion that the majority asserts. 418
Kentucky River revitalizes the Packard debate with opposite effects.
The Kentucky River majority concedes that "independent judgment" is
an ambiguous term both with respect to the degree of discretion re-
quired and with respect to the kind of judgment needed for supervi-
sory status.419 What is not ambiguous is the Board's attempt to attach a
different weight to a nurse's judgment in directing less-skilled workers
to take care of a resident than to her judgment in acting as a building
supervisor. The Board argues that the judgment of employees who are
permitted to exercise a sufficient degree of discretion cannot exercise
independent judgment if it constitutes a particular kind of judgment
termed "ordinary professional judgment" in directing less-skilled em-
ployees. 420 This interpretation inserts, Justice Scalia insists, a "startling
categorical exclusion into the statutory text that does not suggest its
existence."421 Admittedly, the degree of discretion required by section
2 (11), as amplified by such words as "'clerical' or 'routine' as opposed
to 'independent judgment,' falls within the Board's discretion to re-
solve. '422 However, the Board's categorical exclusion, which turns on
factors having nothing to do with the admittedly ambiguous degree of
discretion, goes beyond the limits of what is ambiguous and contra-
dicts what is clear.423 The Board asserts that when an employee exer-
417. Jewett, supra note 58, at 1128 (citing Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S.
485, 492 (1947)).
418. One observer elegantly summarizes Justice Douglas's dissent:
The dissent, by contrast, emphasized the animating spirit of the NLRA, arguing
that the Court and the NLRB should not look solely at the strict definition within
the context of the purpose of the Act as a whole. The NLRA, the dissent argued,
sought to separate and empower employees or "workingmen" as a group distinct
from management; to include supervisors in a bargaining unit contradicts this
fundamental purpose.
Id. at 1128.
419. See Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 99-1815, slip op. at 6 (U.S. May 29,
2001).
420. Id. at 7.
421. Id.
422. Id at 6-7.
423. See id. at 7.
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cises significant judgment that is only loosely constrained by the
employer, if it amounts to "professional judgment," it fails to be inde-
pendent. The Supreme Court relies on the text to deny this conclu-
sion. Its textual analysis limits the Board's capacity to construe
"professional judgment" to nullify the term "independent judgment,"
"that naturally includes them. ' 424 The Court's technique precludes
the Board from narrowing the employer's statutory right to exclude
supervisors from NLRA protection.
On the other hand, the Kentucky River dissent principally relies on
its understanding of the Act's legislative history, the perceived need to
balance the statutory tension that arises because of the inclusion of
professionals with the exclusion of supervisors, 425 and its preference
for current Board policy to effect a broadened interpretation of the
Act's coverage. Still, the dissent declines to ignore textual issues com-
pletely with its assertion that the majority's decision to disallow the
Board from attaching "a different weight to a nurse's judgment that
the employee should take a patient's temperature, even if nurses rou-
tinely instruct others to take a patient's temperature but do not ordi-
narily reassign or discipline employees ... finds no support in the text
of the statute."426 There may be an intuitive argument in favor of both
the Board's and the dissent's conclusion. One could argue that the
defining difference is "that one form of judgment is more closely
linked to management prerogatives than the other."427 This argument
is subject to a straightforward rebuttal, which reveals a potential fallacy
in the Board's conception of the relevant test of independent judg-
ment. As Member Cohen's lucid dissent in a prior case illustrates: The
NLRB, in its determination to replace one misinterpretation with an-
other, ignores the fact that the core of independent judgment is that
the individual's conduct and direction are based on the thought
processes of the individual, rather than on some outside force or per-
son.428 Plainly, an individual who makes personal judgments based on
education, experience, training, and ability is making independent
judgment.429
424. Id. at 14.
425. See Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., No. 99-1815, Stevens, J., dissenting at 5 (U.S. May 29,
2001).
426. Id. at 6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
427. Keller, supra note 54, at 619.
428. See Providence Hosp. and Alaska Nurses' Ass'n, 320 N.L.R.B. 717, 736 (1996) (Co-
hen, Member, dissenting) (cited in Keller, supra note 54, at 619).
429. See id. at 1196-97.
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In contrast to the Kentucky River dissent, the Packard dissent relies
on legislative history and its appreciation of the statute's fundamental
purpose to narrow the interpretation of the Act. Justice Douglas's ap-
proach, undergirded as it is by both the statute's legislative history and
purpose can be linked inescapably to the amended text of the statute
to constrain its coverage of professionals and other skilled personnel
who possess independent judgment when they responsibly direct
others. This nominal debate over textualism versus legislative history
and statutory purpose is, in reality, simply a debate over the proper
conception of the NLRA and its attendant policy objectives. Is the
NLRA a radical statute designed to maximize workplace coverage by
all workers including professionals and those with management exper-
tise or is it a rather unadventurous law designed to provide a limited
opportunity for collective action by a limited number of employees
located primarily within the "working class" who fail to possess any
indicia of management prerogatives?
Paradoxically, one keen opponent of textualism vividly clarifies
the true nature of the debate; he states:
The Board cannot escape the fact that the true distinction between
professionals and supervisors, close alignment with management
prerogatives, is not articulable using the existing components of
the statutory definition of supervisor... [t]wisting the phrase "in-
dependent judgment" does not work .... [g]iven that the NLRB's
distinction between professional judgment and supervisory inde-
pendent judgment is insupportable by the Act's statutory
language. 430
This determination applies with equal force to any future efforts by
the NLRB's effort to amend, if not nullify, Kentucky River's robust con-
ception of "independent judgment." The NLRB's current policy bias
excludes responsible direction of others, when grounded in profes-
sional expertise and experience in determining who is an excluded
supervisor within the meaning of the NLRA. This technique drives
labor policy in a direction that is similar to the Packard majority's (1)
obliteration of the proper line between management and labor,431 (2)
failure to reach a principled and limited determination of who is cov-
ered by the Act, (3) inability to recognize that lower ranked, lower
skilled workers were the proper object of the statute, and (4)
powerlessness to understand that Congress enacted the original NLRA
to obtain limited objectives. Although the Packard Court's deficiencies
430. Keller, supra note 54, at 619-20.
431. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 494 (1947) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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were grounded in its concern for textual purity and its failure to con-
sider the Act's legislative history, and although the Kentucky River dis-
sent and the NLRB are nominally driven by respect for legislative
history, the Board's argument seems largely driven by the conclusion
that the NLRA should cover more employees. This is facilitated by an
expansive conception of section 2(12) even if employees exercise dis-
cretionary judgment in the direction of lesser-skilled employees that
remains indistinguishable from the "independent judgment" contem-
plated by section 2 (11). This procedure, actually ignores or discounts
much legislative history, in general, and Senator Flanders in particu-
lar.43 2 That legislative history indicates that the objective of section
2(11), like both the NLRA generally and the Taft-Hartley Amend-
ments in particular, was to limit employee coverage by excluding
those who engage in the basic act of supervision based on the exercise
of their personal judgment as informed by experience, training and
ability. The Board's technique suggests "unequal treatment of the stat-
utory sections [and] goes against long-standing principles of statutory
interpretation.."433 When courts and justices accept this analysis, they
further current Board policy over the plain language of the Act and
fail to further stability or equality of bargaining. 434 Instead they only
provide incentive for gamesmanship and litigation 4 35 and not the pur-
poses, legislative history, and text of the statute.
While the paradoxes inherent in the debate over the text, statu-
tory purpose, statutory context, and the meaning of legislative history
reinforce, previous conclusions that attempt to resolve disputes about
(1) whether the statute should be seen as a radical class conscious
attempt to reify the conflict between capital and labor; (2) the likely
conflict in interest between individuals who direct and less-skilled
workers; and (3) employer fears concerning potential divided loyalty
432. As Member Cohen demonstrates in his Nymed dissent, the legislative history dem-
onstrates that the addition of "responsibly to direct" in section 2(11)'s definition of super-
visor was designed to cover individuals who exercise professional judgment when directing
other employees. Nymed, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 806, 815 (1996) (Cohen, Member, dissent-
ing). Senator Flanders states:
As an employer for many years past... I can say that the definition of "supervisor"
in this Act seems to be me to cover adequately everything except the basic Act of
supervising .... In fact, under some modern management methods, the supervi-
sor might be deprived of authority for most of the functions enumerated and still
have a large responsibility for the exercise of personal judgment based on per-
sonal experience, training, and ability.
93 CONG. REC. SI 126, 4677-78 (1947).
433. Motley, supra note 249, at 738.
434. See id. at 739.
435. See id.
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adverse to their interest, and while Kentucky River, like Health Care, is
another in a series of reprimands offered to the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, and while the distinctions between Justice Scalia's and
Justice Stevens's analyses confirm that the dispute is "largely over the
degree of employee power in the workplace that can be accepted with-
outjeopardizing employer control,"43 6 it is doubtful that the Supreme
Court analysis and technique will render commentators speechless.
To the contrary, its decision was achieved through a bare majority of
the Court, which provides a rich basis for condemnation. Even if the
holding were unanimous, those observers captivated by a radical con-
ception of both the NLRA and inclusion of professionals in section
2(12) could only concur at the risk of incoherence. One is left with
the enduring prospect of endless elucidation. This leads inexorably to
technique in search of further technique as experts at the NLRB at-
tempt to reverse what the Court finds clear. While Justice Douglas's
Packard dissent richly illustrates that the legislative history is devoid of
any purpose to bring supervisors within the original Act, and absent
any trace of congressional concern with the problems of supervisory
personnel, whilst the Taft-Hartley Amendments deepen that conclu-
sion, and while it is possible to argue on both textualist and other
grounds (including long-standing principles of statutory interpreta-
tion) for a restrained conception of the NLRA, those arguments, how-
ever persuasive, will not end the dispute. On the contrary, the
dissatisfaction of the NLRB with the Kentucky River outcome will likely
inspire additional efforts to find the legislative history upon which to
articulate technically, what from its perspective remains at best ineffa-
ble and at worst statutorily impermissible-the distinction between
professional as opposed to independent judgment. To do otherwise,
amounts to its concurrence in the diminution of its power and author-
ity. The Board's most recent effort either constitutes an insupportable
distinction without a difference or a clear effort to manipulate the
statutory language in a manner that violates its text and its animating
purpose.
Conclusion
We are often the captives of our pictures of the world, and in the
end, if the world does not look just like them, their influence on
our perceptions is nevertheless profound.4 37
436. Feldman, Workplace Power, supra note 43, at 526.
437. JERRY L. MASi-AW, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IM-
PROVE PUBLIC LUW 1 (1997).
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Law is an articial creation of man and not something given to man
in nature.438
The fact that the drafters of the NLRA could not have imagined
either the present composition or the contemporary transformation
of the workplace seems obvious. As the workplace continues its meta-
morphosis through decentralization, professionalism, and post-indus-
trialism, hands-on workers who are transformed by education,
experience, skills, and training inevitably make personal judgments in
directing lesser-skilled workers and thus transcend ancient boundaries
between workers and foremen. In its 1947 Amendments to the Wag-
ner Act, Congress defined supervisors as individuals who responsibly
direct others through the exercise of independent, uncabined discre-
tion grounded in their own thought processes. Such individuals are to
be excluded from the protective umbrella provided by the NLRA be-
cause to do otherwise would expose employers (a newly protected
class) and management to the threat of both divided loyalty and the
necessity of negotiating with itself. While it must be admitted that
even Supreme Court pronouncements are subject to Ellul's caution-
ary notion that law is an artificial creation, 439 the Court appropriately
vindicates a robust conception of independent judgment in respon-
sibly directing others and thus diminishes these threats. It rightly re-
jects attempts to constrain section 2(11)'s supervisory exclusion
through strained interpretations of the language of section 2(12).
Whether the NLRB is provoked by radical class consciousness, a
misunderstanding of contemporary management and the present
workplace, or by pictures of the labor world as it ought to be, one may
never know. In any case, Justice Douglas's cautionary explication of
the original NLRA implies that hermeneutic doubts should be re-
solved in favor of a narrow conception of NLRA coverage. The Su-
preme Court's Kentucky Riverjudgment vindicates this approach and
limits the power of the NLRB. Doubtlessly, this decision will spur the
Board to refine its technique. That prospect is an unavoidable feature
of modern life. It remains to be seen whether such efforts, in conjunc-
tion with the Court's likely response, will result in human "progress"
or confirm Jacques Ellul's prophecy that modern society will largely
consist of increasing submission to "de-humanization" through inde-
terminate yet expansive technique.
438. Andrew Goddard, supra note 195, at 179 (summarizing the writings of Jacques
Ellul).
439. See id.
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